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TERMINATION OF TAXABLE YEARS: THE QUAGMIRE
OF INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 6851
Although it is by now axiomatic that the right of the government
to safeguard the revenues will prevail over almost any challenge,' the
early part of this century was marked by an overriding concern with
the collectibility of taxes. Prior to 1924 a taxpayer was afforded no
opportunity to litigate his tax liability prior to voluntary payment or
collection by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) of an amount ad-
ministratively determined. To ensure maximum collection efficiency,
broad administrative powers were delegated to the IRS both to determine
a taxpayer's liability and to collect the tax through lien, levy, and dis-
traint. The only ostensible limitation on the plenary power of the IRS
to collect taxes was a requirement that the liability be "due and payable."
As a result of this requisite to collection, however, a taxpayer bent on
evading payment of anticipated taxes could place his property beyond
the reach of the Service before the end of the taxable year, the normal
time at which a liability would become fixed and thus "due and pay-
able." In an apparent attempt to avoid such a contingency, Congress,
in 1919, enacted a provision permitting the IRS, upon a determination
that a taxpayer had acted or intended to act in a manner tending to
prejudice future collection of taxes, to terminate his taxable year, there-
by making the anticipated taxes prematurely due and payable.2 This
provision perfected the Service's authority to protect the revenue and
was clearly in accord with the prevailing policy of "pay first-litigate
later."
In 1924 Congress concluded that such harsh collection policies were
unnecessary.3 Acting upon the assumption that the vast majority of
1. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931). See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 91-92, 92 n.24 (1972) (for purposes of constitutional due process, collection
of. internal revenue may involve "extraordinary situations" justifying summary seizure
of property without notice and opportunity for prior hearing).
2. Act of Feb. 24, 1919, ch. 18, § 250(g), 40 Stat. 1084.
3. See H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1924), 1939-1, Pt. 2 Cums. BuuL.
246-47:
The right of appeal after payment of the tax is an incomplete remedy,
and does little to remove the hardship occasioned by an incorrect assess-
ment. The payment of a large additional tax on income received several
years previous and which may have, since its receipt, been either wiped
out by subsequent losses, invested in nonliquid assets, or spent, sometimes
forces taxpayers into bankruptcy, and often causes great financial hardship
and sacrifice. These results are not remedied by permitting the taxpayer
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taxpayers were willing to pay their just taxes, Congress established a
procedure by which most taxpayers, prior to paying a tax, could ob-
tain an independent judicial redetermination of tax liabilities asserted
by the IRS. Prior to assessing or collecting a tax, the Service was now
required to issue a notice of deficiency4 to the taxpayer, receipt of which
stayed further activities by the IRS for 90 days. During this period the
taxpayer could challenge in the Board of Tax Appeals5 the propriety
or amount of the administratively determined liability.
Taxpayer rights under the new deficiency procedures were qualified,
however, since a belief by the Service that delay would "jeopardize"
collection warranted collection without the opportunity for prior judi-
cial intervention. 6 Nevertheless, even in jeopardy cases, the Service was
required to issue a notice of deficiency immediately after the tax was
collected, 7 thereby affording the taxpayer ready access to the Board.
Although throughout the process of revision Congress left the termi-
nation of taxable year provision substantially unchanged," the Service
made little use of its power thereunder. 9 As a result, there was no op-
to sue for the recovery of the tax after this payment. He is entitled to an
appeal and to a determination of his liability for the tax prior to its
payment.
4. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 234, § 274, 43 Stat. 297-98.
5. The Revenue Act of 1924, Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 234, § 900, 43 Stat. 336-38, estab-
lished the Board of Tax Appeals. By filing an appeal to the Board, a taxpayer could
suspend the Service's authority to employ its administrative collection remedies. Id.
§ 274(a)-(c), 43 Stat. 297. Since the government always had the opportunity to in-
stitute a further suit in the district courts, however, the Board was little more than
an advisory body. Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265, 1269 (D. Md. 1969), aff'd
on rehearing, 7 P-H 1974 FED. TAXES (33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d) 74-462 (Dec. 19, 1973).
The Revenue Act of 1926, Act of Feb. 26, 1926, ch. 27, §§ 1001-05, 44 Stat. 109-11, subse-
quently elevated the Board to a position similar to that of the present Tax Court. For
a brief but excellent treatment of the early development of the Board's authority, see
the discussion in Schreck v. United States, supra, at 1268-71.
6. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 234, § 274(d), 43 Stat. 297.
7. This requirement, not included in the Revenue Act of 1924, was introduced as
Act of Feb. 26, 1926, ch. 27, § 279(b), 44 Stat. 59 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 6861 (b)).
8. The termination of taxable year provision was repeatedly reenacted in language
substantially identical to that of section 250(g) of the Revenue Act of 1918. Act of
Nov. 23, 1921, ch. 136, § 250(g), 42 Stat. 267; Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 234, § 282,
43 Stat. 302; Act of Feb. 26, 1926, ch. 27, § 285, 44 Stat. 68; Act of May 29, 1928, ch.
852, § 147, 45 Stat. 836; Act of June 6, 1932, ch. 209, § 146, 47 Stat. 217; Act of May
10, 1934, ch. 277, § 146, 48 Stat. 725; Act of June 22, 1936, ch. 690, § 146, 49 Stat. 1703;
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 146, 53 Star. 63; INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 6851.
9. Until recently, the termination of taxable year provision was used primarily
against aliens who were departing the country. See, e.g., Rogan v. Mertens, 153
F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1946).
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portunity for the courts to determine whether a taxpayer whose tax-
able year had been terminated was subject to the earlier collection pro-
cedures or those newly developed. A potential conflict clearly existed
between the termination of taxable year provision, designed for use in
a system based upon administrative collection, and the deficiency pro-
cedures, which recognized rights of taxpayers to prepayment litigation
of their tax liabilities.
Recently, the IRS has begun to employ section 6851 to accelerate the
due date for the payment of income taxes allegedly owed by individuals
suspected of narcotics, gambling, and other criminal offenses.10 Attempts
by the taxpayers involved to require the Service to employ the modem
collection procedures have brought into focus the conflict which had
lain dormant for over 40 years. To understand fully the controversy
which has arisen with respect to the termination of taxable year section,
it is necessary to examine the functions of that provision and the uses
to which it recently has been put by the IRS.
Section 6851 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954" requires the
district director 2 to terminate the taxable year if he finds that a taxpayer
"designs quickly to depart from the United States or to remove his
10. See, e.g., Lisner v. McCanless, 356 F. Supp. 398 (D. Ariz. 1973), appeal pending
(narcotics); Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md. 1969) (wagering);
United States v. Bonaguro, 294 F. Supp. 750 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (counterfeiting).
11. This provision codifies, in substantially identical language, the 1918 statute which
originally authorized termination of a taxable year. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6851 (a) (1)
provides:
If the Secretary or his delegate finds that a taxpayer designs quickly to
depart from the United States or to remove his property therefrom, or to
conceal himself or his property therein, or to do any other act tending to
prejudice or to render wholly or partly ineffectual proceedings to collect
the income tax for the current or the preceding taxable year unless such
proceedings be brought without delay, the Secretary or his delegate shall
declare the taxable period for such taxpayer immediately terminated, and
shall cause notice of such finding and declaration to be given the taxpayer,
together with a demand for immediate payment of. the tax for the taxable
period so declared terminated and of the tax for the preceding taxable year
or so much of such tax as is unpaid, whether or not the time otherwise al-
lowed by law for filing return and paying the tax has expired; and such
taxes shall thereupon become immediately due and payable. In any pro-
ceeding in court brought to enforce payment of taxes made due and pay-
able by virtue of the provisions of this section, the finding of the Secre-
tary or his delegate, made as herein provided, whether made after notice
to the taxpayer or not, shall be for all purposes presumptive evidence of
jeopardy.
12. The Secretary's authority has been delegated to the district directors. Treas.
Reg. § 1.6851-1 (1959).
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property therefrom, or to conceal himself or his property therein, or
to do any other act tending to prejudice or to render wholly or partly
ineffectual proceedings to collect the income tax .... ." 13 Notice of
the termination must be given the taxpayer and a demand made for
payment of the tax on income received during the period thus termi-
nated. The section explicitly renders the taxes immediately due and
payable, as they ordinarily would be on the last day for filing a return
and paying the tax for the full year.
Rather than proceeding against the short period taxpayer as though
the full year had expired, however, the Service maintains that the re-
peated reenactment of section 6851 without any explicit integration of
its provisions with the modern deficiency procedures evidences a con-
gressional intent that the short period liability be collected solely by ad-
ministrative devices. 14 The Service thus contends that once taxes are
made prematurely due and payable, it may exercise its general assess-
ment authority15 and proceed immediately to collect the tax'6 through
lien,17 levy, and distraint.'8 Under the Service's interpretation of the
interrelation of the procedural Code provisions, the section 6851 tax-
payer has no right of access to the Tax Court until the Service determines
to collect the taxes for the full year, at which time the ordinary pro-
cedures are, of course, applicable. Since the Service is given at least
three years to complete an audit and proceed to collect full year liabili-
ties,' 9 such an interpretation places an onerous burden on a taxpayer
whose entire assets have been seized.
13. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6851 (a) (1).
14. E.g., Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265, 1271 (D. Md. 1969).
15. The general authorization is contained in INrr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6201.
Although the Service now argues that section 6201 authorizes assessment of terminated
period liabilities, it has, in the past, relied upon other sections. See notes 77-78 infra
& accompanying text.
16. Ordinarily, the Service may not levy under section 6331 until ten days after
notice and demand. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6331(a). In a jeopardy situation, how-
ever, levy is permitted immediately after notice and demand. Id.
17. Id. § 6321.
18. Id. § 6331.
19. The statute of limitations does not begin to run until after expiration of the
full year. IrN. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6501 (a) provides that the Service must assess within
three years of the date a return is filed for the full year. The Service thus has three
years to issue the deficiency notice which gives the taxpayer access to the Tax Court,
since such a notice must be issued prior to an assessment (id. § 6213(a)) or, in case
of jeopardy, within 60 days thereafter (id. § 6861(b)). Code section 6501(e) extends
to six years the period of limitations when the taxpayer fails to report an amount in
excess of 25 percent of his stated gross income, and section 6501(c) suspends the
statute in certain cases involving fraud, evasion, and failure to file a return.
1974]
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Because of the inherent harshness of the Service's use of section 6851,
taxpayers, understandably, have sought relief. Presently, a terminated
period taxpayer has three alternative courses of action. The tax may
be paid and a refund suit brought in a United States district court 0 or
the Court of Claims,2' bond may be posted under the provisions of sec-
tion 6851,22 or an injunctive suit may be brought in a federal district
court to restrain assessment or collection of the tax. 3
Although the district courts and the Court of Claims have jurisdic-
tion over all cases in which a taxpayer seeks a refund of any tax which
he alleges to have been assessed or collected erroneously or illegally,24
the Supreme Court in Flora v. United States25 held that full payment
of the tax liability asserted by the Service is a jurisdictional prerequisite
to such a suit. In most situations, the full payment rule clearly is ap-
propriate. The ordinary taxpayer may seek judicial relief in two forums:
prepayment review in the Tax Court or postpayment review in a dis-
trict court. If taxpayers were permitted to bring refund suits after
paying only a portion of the amount in dispute, the suit would, in fact,
be not for a refund but for prepayment review, thereby clouding the
distinction between the two kinds of action and rendering prepayment
review in the Tax Court meaningless.26
Arguably, a taxpayer whose taxable year has been terminated should
not be required to satisfy the full payment rule. The underlying
premise of that rule, the availability of prepayment review,27 is tenuous,
20. The United States district courts have jurisdiction to entertain suits for the
refund of taxes under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1970).
21. The United States Court of Claims derives refund suit jurisdiction from 28
U.S.C. § 1491 (1970).
22. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6851 (e).
23. Injunctive suits necessarily must be brought in the federal district courts, since
there is no jurisdiction to grant equitable relief in either the Tax Court (Hays
Corp, 40 T.C. 436 (1963), aff'd, 331 F.2d 422 (7th Cir. 1964)) or the Court of Claims,
the jurisdiction of which is limited to granting money judgments against the United
States (Zimmerman v. United States, 422 F.2d 326 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S.
911 (1970)).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1970).
25. 362 U.S. 145 (1960). With respect to excise taxes, the Court held that "full
payment" could be on the basis of a single transaction or unit. Id. at 175 n.38. See
Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265, 1284 n.32 (D. Md. 1969).
26. Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 175-76, 176 n.41 (1960).
27. A second rationale for the rule suggested by the Supreme Court in Flora is to
prevent disruption of the voluntary payment system. 362 U.S. at 176. See Riordan,
Must You Pay Full Tax Assessment Before Suing in the District Court?, 8 J. TAX.
179, 181 (1958). This rationale is not persuasive in section 6851 cases, since a taxpayer
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at best, in this context.28 Nevertheless, in light of the broad holding in
Flora and decisions explicitly holding the full payment rule applicable
to section 6851 cases, 29 it appears that full payment is a prerequisite to
a section 6851 refund suit.30
Requiring full payment in a section 6851 situation, however, may
negate the potential utility of refund suits as a means for challenging
the assessment of a terminated period liability. Under the full payment
rule, a refund suit has utility to the section 6851 taxpayer only where
the value of his assets seized by the Service exceeds the amount of the
tax31 or where the taxpayer has other liquid assets with which to pay the
difference. Moreover, a taxpayer must wait at least six months from
the time a claim for refund is made until suit may be brought. 2 Because
the primary concern of the section 6851 taxpayer generally is to
secure a speedy return of his assets, the refund action clearly is inap-
propriate for his purposes.
Most of the practical obstacles to the efficient use of the refund action
are also encountered when the remedy of posting bond is sought. Al-
though Code section 6851(e) 31 provides for the immediate stay of
collection proceedings when bond is furnished in the amount of taxes
owed, such relief is clearly illusory if the government has seized sub-
who:e conduct has caused the Service to terminate his taxable year for jeopardy
would have been unlikely to pay voluntarily in any event.
28. Since the issuance of a statutory notice of deficiency is a jurisdictional pre-
requisite to a hearing in the Tax Court and since the IRS currently refuses to issue
such a notice for a short period liability, the taxpayer is foreclosed from using the
Tax Court for prepayment review.
29. At least two courts have indicated specifically that a refund suit is unavailable
to a section 6851 taxpayer unable to pay the full tax asserted. Rambo v. United States,
353 F. Supp. 1021 (W.D. Ky. 1972), affd, 7 P-H 1974 FED. TAXES (33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d)
74-463 (6th Cir. Feb. 12, 1974); Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md.
1969), aff'd on rehearing, 7 P-H 1974 FED. TAxEs (33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d) 74-462 (Dec.
19, 1973).
30. But see Irving v. Gray, 479 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1973), in which the court suggested
in dictum that the full payment rule is inapplicable in section 6851 actions.
31. In Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md. 1969), the government
refused to apply the seized assets to payment of the tax because they were proceeds of
illegal wagering operations and therefore subject to forfeiture. id. at 1281.
32. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6532(a).
33. Id. § 6851(e) provides: "Payment of taxes shall not be enforced by any pro-
ceedings under the provisions of this section prior to the expiration of the time other-
wise allowed for paying such taxes if, the taxpayer furnishes, under regulations pre-
scribed by the Secretary or his delegate, a bond to insure the timely making of returns
with respect to, and payment of, such taxes . .. ."
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stantially all of a taxpayer's assets.3 4 Even in situations in which the
taxpayer has sufficient additional assets to afford the fee of a professional
bonding company, it is unlikely that such a company would be willing
to accept the risk."
The impracticality and limited applicability of the refund suit and
bond in the section 6851 context suggest the use of the injunction as the
most effective source of relief. Although the section 6851 taxpayer
seeking equitable relief faces a substantial barrier in the provisions of
section 742136 prohibiting suits to restrain the assessment or collection
of any tax, the effect of that section is mitigated somewhat by two ex-
ceptions to its operation. First, assessment or collection of any income,
estate, or gift tax may be enjoined under section 6213 (a) 37 if the IRS
fails to notify the taxpayer of the "deficiency" in the tax. The avail-
ability of this remedy depends upon the taxpayer's ability to establish
that the short period liability is a "deficiency." The second exception
permits injunctive relief notwithstanding the anti-injunction statute upon
a judicial finding of "exceptional circumstances." Under this judicially
carved exception to the operation of section 7421, a taxpayer can pre-
vail upon showing threatened irreparable harm and the inability of the
government to prevail on the merits.8 It would appear that the most
favorable means available to the section 6851 taxpayer attempting to
alleviate the harsh consequences following upon termination of his
taxable year is to seek to satisfy the requirements of either the statutory
or judicial exception to the anti-injunction statute. Before considering
the taxpayer's chances of obtaining equitable relief, it is essential to dis-
cuss in detail the statutory framework which governs the administra-
tive action sought to be restrained.
34. In Kimmel v. Tomlinson, 151 F. Supp. 901, 902 (S.D. Fla. 1957), the court ob-
served: "In the instant case every bit of property (inclusive of bank accounts) of both
taxpayers (and their wives) has been seized; it would seem to be mere mockery to say
they, after they have been stripped of all assets, are protected in that they may either
post a bond or pay the three hundred odd thousand dollars of taxes and penalties
assessed in order to stay the waste of a forced sale of their assets and the certain de-
struction of their business.'
35. See Gould, Jeopardy Assessments: When They May Be Levied and What To Do
About Them, N.Y.U. 18TrH INsT. ON FED. TAx. 937, 945 (1960); Note, Jeopardy Assess-
ment: The Sovereign's Stranglehold, 55 GEo. LJ. 701, 706 (1967).
36. INT. RE V. CoDE oF 1954, § 7421(a) provides: "Except as provided in sections
6212(a) and (c), 6213 (a), and 7426(a) and (b) (1), no suit for the purpose of restraining
the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person,
whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed."
37. Id. § 6213 (a).
38. See notes 110-14 infra & accompanying text.
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THE ASSESSMENT/COLLECTION FRAMEWORK
The Importance of Assessment
The term "assessment" is defined operationally in the Internal Rev-
enue Code, section 6203 providing merely that "assessment shall be made
by recording the liability of the taxpayer" on the books of the Service.39
The mere act of recordation, although perhaps appearing insignificant,
constitutes a formal determination of liability by the IRS. Moreover,
an examination of the statutory collection provisions and their judicial
interpretations evidences that administrative collection depends upon
an authorized assessment.
Section 6321 of the Code provides that if a taxpayer fails to pay a
tax after demand the amount of the tax "shall be a lien in favor of the
United States upon all property . . . belonging to such person." 41 A
related section fixes the time at which a lien arises, stating: "Unless an-
other date is specifically fixed by law, the lien imposed by section 6321
shall arise at the time the assessment is made .... " 4 Thus, the tax-
payer's failure to pay upon demand creates the lien, which then relates
back to the time of assessment.42
39. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6203 provides, in full: "The assessment shall be made
by recording the liability of the taxpayer in the office of the Secretary or his delegate
in accordance with rules or regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate.
Upon request of the taxpayer, the Secretary or his delegate shall furnish the taxpayer
a copy of the record of the assessment."
40. Id. § 6321 provides, in full: "If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or
refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount (including any interest, additional
amount, addition to tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue
in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property
and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person."
41. Id. § 6322. This section appears to require an assessment as a condition precedent
to a valid lien. Nevertheless, it has been argued that the phrase "[ulnless another date is
specifically fixed by law" implies that the Service may, by regulation, make the lien
contingent upon some event other than assessment. Meyers, Termination of Taxable
Year: Procedures in Jeopardy, 26 TAX L. REv. 829, 847 (1971). It is submitted that
had Congress intended to permit the Service to promulgate regulations with respect
to the time at which a lien arises it would have so provided explicitly. Moreover, INT.
Riv. CODE OF 1954, § 6302(a), which authorizes the Service to promulgate regulations
with respect to the "mode or time" for collecting any tax, limits that authority to
situations in which the mode or time of collection "is not provided for by this title."
Section 6322 specifically declares that liens shall arise at the time assessment is made;
the disclaimer "unless another date is specifically fixed by law" probably refers not to
the authority of the Service to change this time by regulation but to those situations
in which a lien arises by operation of law, as with a judgment lien.
42. Most courts construing these sections have concluded that an assessment is a
prerequisite to a valid lien. See, e.g., Kennebec Box Co. v. O.S. Richards Corp., 5
19741
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Although the provisions with respect to levy are less clear, it appears
that assessment is also prerequisite to a valid levy. Under section 6331,
if a person liable for any tax fails to pay within 10 days after notice and
demand, the Commissioner may levy upon "all property and rights to
property . .. belonging to such person or on which there is a lien." 41
The section arguably permits seizure of a taxpayer's property, whether
or not there has been an assessment, since property may be levied upon
even though it is not subject to a lien and since there otherwise is no
mention of a prior assessment of the liability. It is inconceivable, how-
ever, that Congress would require an assessment as a prerequisite to a
valid lien and simultaneously permit the more drastic action of levy in
the absence of some formal determination that a tax liability exists. 44
A further indication that a tax must be assessed before it may be col-
lected by levy is found in the relevant statutes of limitations in the
Code. While these sections clearly do not control the order in which
the Service must take administrative action, their organization and lan-
F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1925); Coson v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Cal. 1958),
aff'd on other grounds, 286 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1961); Hill v. Firemen's Ins. Co, 25 F.2d
1007 (W.D. Ark. 1928). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, re-
jecting the proposition that assessment by the IRS is necessary to a valid lien, has
held that a tax liability as shown on a taxpayer's return is sufficient basis from which
a lien may arise. Macatee, Inc. v. United States, 214 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1954). The court
in Macatee held only that a tax liability could be established from the taxpayer's re-
turn, as well as by assessment, and that refusal to pay this liability on demand gives rise
to a lien on the taxpayer's property in the amount of the unpaid liability. The tax-
payer's return, as used by the Macatee court as a basis for determining the liability, may
aptly be described as a self-assessment. For a discussion of the self-assessment concept,
see 9 J. MERTENS, JR., LAW oF FEDERAL INcomE TAxA-noN § 49.81 (rev. ed. 1971).
It is submitted that the holding in Macatee does not contradict, but rather rein-
forces, the controlling principle: a formal determination of liability is prerequisite to
a valid lien. The cases, read together, suggest that this formal determination may be
made either by the self-assessment of the taxpayer on his return or by the IRS ad-
ministratively.
43. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 6331(a) (emphasis supplied). The section provides,
in pertinent part: "If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the
same within 10 days after notice and demand, it shall be lawful for the Secretary or
his delegate to collect such tax (and such further sum as shall be sufficient to cover the
expenses of the levy) by levy upon all property and rights to property (except such
property as is exempt under section 6334) belonging to such person or on which there
is a lien provided in this chapter for the payment of such tax ...."
44. The presence in section 6331 of the same requirement that the taxpayer be
"liable to pay tax"' which is found in section 6321, and which has been held to neces-
sitate a formal determination of tax liability as a requisite of a valid lien under that
section, would appear to buttress the conclusion that a similar formal determination
is essential to a valid levy.
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guage serve as valid indicia that Congress intended that levy be preceded
by assessment. Section 6501 establishes time limits for making assess-
ments and for court pr'oceedings for collection when there has been no
assessment.5 On the other hand, levy is treated specifically in section
6502, which establishes a separate statute of limitations for "Collection
After Assessment." 46 Clearly, neither the mere placement of "levy"
in this section nor the terms of the section prohibits levy without assess-
ment; it is submitted, however, that such placement buttresses the argu-
ment against any presumed congressional intent to permit the use of this
extreme collection procedure without some prior, formal determination
of tax liability.
Although use of administrative collection techniques thus requires
a prior, formal determination of liability, it is clear that a collection
suit47 may be brought without a prior assessment.4  Nevertheless, the
utility of such a suit to the government is dependent upon a prior assess-
ment, since it is well established that an assessment is presumed valid49
and constitutes prima facie evidence of the taxpayer's liability. ° To
45. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, 5 6501(a) provides: "Except as otherwise provided in
this section, the amount of any tax imposed by this title shall be assessed within 3
years after the return was filed ...and no proceeding in court without assessment
for the collection of such tax shall be begun after the expiration of such period" (em-
phasis supplied). One reasonable inference which may be drawn from the failure of
this section explicitly to limit the use of administrative collection without prior assess-
ment is that Congress perceived no need for a statute of limitations in this area, since
it never intended to authorize the use of levy and distraint without a prior assessment.
46. Id. § 6502 (a) provides: "Where the assesszent of any tax imposed by this title
has been made within the period of limitation properly applicable thereto, such tax may
be collected by levy or by a proceeding in court, but only if the levy is made or the
proceeding begun-() within 6 years after the assessment of the tax, or (2) prior to
the expiration of any period for collection agreed upon in writing ... "' (emphasis
supplied).
47. Collection suits are permitted under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7401, if specifically
authorized by the Secretary or his delegate. Treas. Reg. § 301.7401-1(a), T.D. 6902,
1967-I Cum~.. BOL. 370, delegates the power to authorize such suits to the Commissioner
and to the Chief Counsel of the IRS or his delegate. INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7402
grants the federal district courts jurisdiction over collection suits.
48. King v. United States, 99 U.S. 229 (1878); United States v. Ayer, 12 F.2d 194
(Ist Cir. 1926); Hopper v. Rothensies, 30 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1665 (D. Pa. 1942).
49. Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446 (1959); Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507
(1935).
50. Niles Bement Pond Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 357 (1930); United States v.
Rindskopf, 105 U.S. 418 (1881); Greer v. United States, 408 F.2d 631 (6th Cir. 1969);
Ginsberg v. United States, 19 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1549 (C.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd on other
grounds, 408 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1969); In re Glover-McConnell Co, 9 F.2d 683 (ND.
Ga. 1925).
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rebut this prima facie case a taxpayer normally must establish, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, that the assessment was invalid. 51
Because an assessment forms the foundation for valid exercise of ad-
ministrative collection procedures and effectually shifts the burden of
proof to the taxpayer-defendant in collection suits, it is not surprising
that one court has declared: "An assessment . . . has the force of a
judgment." 52 The utility of an assessment, however, depends upon its
validity. If it can be established that an assessment was improper or
unauthorized, a taxpayer can bring suit notwithstanding the anti-injunc-
tion statute to invalidate the assessment and thereby restrain further col-
lection activities by the Service.
The Assessment Procedure
The general authorization for all assessments is embodied in Code
section 6201,11 which authorizes and requires the district director"4 to
assess all taxes imposed by the Internal Revenue Code. This authority
is enhanced by the anti-injunction statute, section 7421, which prohibits
suits to restrain the assessment or collection of any tax. 5 In the case of
income, estate, gift, and certain excise taxes, however, the Service's abili-
ty to assess is restricted significantly by the joint operation of three
sections of the Code. When the tax calculated by the IRS exceeds the
liability shown by the taxpayer on his return, section 6211 terms the
excess a deficiency. 5 In all cases in which the Service asserts that the
51. United States v. Miller, 19 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1751 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). But see
Compton v. United States, 334 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1964); Kentucky Trust Co. v. Glenn,
217 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1954) (holding that the presumption of validity disappears from
the case upon the introduction of evidence to overcome it).
52. Lisner v. McCanless, 356 F. Supp. 398, 402 n.7 (D. Ariz. 1973), appeal pending. See
9 J. MERTENS, JR., supra note 42, § 49.186.
53. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, S 6201 (a) provides, in pertinent part: "The Secretary or his
delegate is authorized and required to make the inquiries, determinations, and assess-
ments of all taxes (including interest, additional amounts, additions to the tax, and
assessable penalties) imposed by this title, or accruing under any former internal
revenue law, which have not been duly paid by stamp at the time and in the manner
provided by law." Authority under this section "extends to and includes" taxes shown
on a return, unpaid taxes payable by stamp, erroneous income tax prepayment credits,
and erroneous credit under Code section 39.
54. Treas. Reg. § 301.6201-1 (1954) indicates that the Secretary's authority has been
delegated to the district directors.
55. See note 36 supra & accompanying text.
56. INTr. REv. CODE OF 1954, 5 6211(a) is definitional and provides: "For purposes
of this tide in the case of income, estate, gift, and excise taxes, imposed by subtitles A
and B, and chapter 42, the term "deficiency" means the amount by which the tax
[ ol. 15:658
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taxpayer owes an additional amount, section 6212 "authorizes" the Serv-
ice to notify the taxpayer that a deficiency has been determined.5 7
Although the language of this section is merely permissive, it is clear
from section 6213 (a) 5 that provision of notice is mandatory. 9
Section 6213 (a) states unequivocally that "no assessment of a de-
ficiency ... and no levy or proceeding in court for its collection shall
be made, begun, or prosecuted until such notice [of deficiency] has
been mailed to the taxpayer . ," 11 The section further provides that
a taxpayer, within 90 days after the statutory notice has been mailed,
may petition the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency.
Collection activities are suspended during this period and, if a petition
is filed, until the decision of the Tax Court has become final. More
importantly, the section provides that failure of the Service to comply
with the deficiency procedures permits a taxpayer suit, notwithstanding
the anti-injunction statute, to enjoin the assessment, levy, or court pro-
ceeding for collection of the amount allegedly due. The importance
to the taxpayer of these procedures is manifest. The notice of de-
imposed by subtitle A or B or chapter 42 exceeds the excess of-(1) the sum of (A)
the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer upon his return, if a return was made
by the taxpayer and an amount was shown as the tax by the taxpayer thereon, plus
(B) the amounts previously assessed (or collected without assessment) as a deficiency,
over- (2) the amount of rebates . . . made." Treas. Reg. § 301.6211-I(a) (1954) de-
fines deficiency as "the excess of the tax . . . over the sum of the amount shown
as such tax by the taxpayer upon his return and the amounts previously assessed . .. "
57. INT. REv. CoDo oF 1954, § 6212(a) provides: "If the Secretary or his delegate
determines that there is a deficiency in respect of any tax imposed by subtitle A or B
or chapter 42, he is authorized to send notice of such deficiency to the taxpayer by
certified mail or registered mail."
58. Id. § 6213 (a) provides, in pertinent part:
Within 90 days . . . after the notice of deficiency authorized in section
6212 is mailed ... the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court for
redetermination of the deficiency. Except as otherwise provided in section
6861 no assessment of a deficiency... and no levy or proceeding in court
for its collection shall be made, begun, or prosecuted until such notice has
been mailed to the taxpayer, nor until the expiration of such 90-day . . .
period . . . nor, if a petition has been filed with the Tax Court, until the
decision of the Tax Court has become final. Notvithstanding the provisions
of section 7421 (a), the making of such assessment or the beginning of such
proceeding or levy during the time such prohibition is in force may be
enjoined by a proceeding in the proper court.
59. See M. GARBis & R. FRoAms, PRocEDuREs nq FEDERAL TAX CoNTRovERsiEs 4-2 (1968).
60. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 6213 (a).
WILLIAM. AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:658
ficiency is a "ticket to the Tax Court";61 if the Service contravenes the
statutory requirements, all collection activity may be enjoined.
Recognizing that these procedures might not be appropriate in all
situations, the drafters of the Code provided in section 6861 that liability
may be assessed immediately without regard to the 90-day constraint
provided in section 6213(a) if the Commissioner "believes" that as-
sessment or collection of a deficiency is in "jeopardy." 62 Although the
effect of this provision is to permit assessment and immediate levy upon
a taxpayer's assets 3 without affording him the opportunity for prepay-
ment review, its harshness is mitigated somewhat by section 6861 (b),64
which requires the Service to issue a notice of deficiency within 60
days after making a jeopardy assessment. This "ticket to the Tax
Court" thus ensures the taxpayer of fairly immediate review. The
Service, moreover, is prohibited from selling a taxpayer's seized assets
during the 60-day period, or, if a petition has been filed for judicial
review, during the pendency of that proceeding. 5 In addition, an assess-
ment may be abated if the IRS subsequently determines that "jeopardy
61. Corbett v. Frank, 293 F.2d 501, 502-03 (9th Cit. 1961); Schreck v. United States,
301 F. Supp. 1265, 1268 (D. Md. 1969). Although the deficiency procedure is treated
within the fabric of the Code as an "exception!' to the general rule of "pay first-litigate
later," the breadth of the section 6213 exception (income, estate, and gift taxes) suggests
that it subsumes the general rule for all practical purposes.
62. TNT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6861(a) provides: "If the Secretary or his delegate
believes that the assessment or collection of a deficiency as defined in section 6211, will
be jeopardized by delay, he shall, notwithstanding the provisions of section 6213(a),
immediately assess such deficiency (together with all interest, additional amounts, and
additions to the tax provided for by law), and notice and demand shall be made by
the Secretary or his delegate for the payment thereof."
63. Ordinarily, a taxpayer must be given at least 10 days from the date of demand
for payment before the Service may levy on his assets. Id. § 6331. If, however, the
district director finds that collection of the tax is in jeopardy, failure of the taxpayer
to pay the tax on demand permits "collection thereof by levy . . . without regard to
the 10-day period provided in this section." Id.
64. Id. § 6861(b) provides: "If the jeopardy assessment is made before any notice
in respect of the tax to which the jeopardy assessment relates has been mailed under
section 6212(a), then the Secretary or his delegate shall mail a notice under such
subsection within 60 days after the making of the assessment."
65. Id. § 6863 (b) (3) (A). The prohibition on the sale of seized property applies even
if the taxpayer has not posted bond under section 6863 (a). Id. Assets may be sold,
however, if the taxpayer consents, if the Service finds that expenses of conservation
and maintenance will greatly reduce the net proceeds, or if the property is perish-
able. Id. § 6863 (b) (3) (B).
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does not exist." 16 Finally, if adequate bond is posted by the taxpayer,
collection may be stayed.67
The foregoing analysis indicates not only the importance of an assess-
ment as the foundation for administrative and judicial tax collection
but also the restrictive effect of the deficiency procedures upon the
Service's authority to assess. In ordinary cases a taxpayer must be af-
forded the opportunity for prepayment review in the Tax Court; in
situations under section 6861 involving "jeopardy," although the re-
strictions are lifted and the IRS may assess and collect the deficiency
immediately, reasonably prompt access to judicial review is guaranteed.
The availability of Tax Court review in both situations is linked to the
taxpayer's receipt of a deficiency notice.
The basis for termination of the taxable year under section 6851 is
a finding that assessment or collection is in "jeopardy." Clearly, if the
short period liability is deemed a "deficiency," the jeopardy procedures
under section 6861 would control: immediate assessment and collection,
notice of the deficiency within 60 days of assessment, and ready access
to the Tax Court for review of the Service's actions. Failure by the IRS
to adhere to this procedure would result in a successful taxpayer in-
junction suit under the section 6213 (a) exception to the anti-injunction
statute."8 If, on the other hand, the liability for the terminated period
66. Id. S 6861(g). The authority to abate does not extend to cases in which the Tax
Court has rendered a decision or in which the 90-day period of section 6213 (a) has
expired without the filing of a petition. Section 6861(g) also tolls the statute of limita-
tions on assessments during the time the abated assessment was in force.
67. Code section 6863(a) provides for the stay of collection of all or part of the
amount of an assessment upon the filing "within such time as may be fixed by regula-
tions . . . [of] a bond in an amount equal to the amount as to which the stay is
desired, conditioned upon the payment of the amount (together with interest thereon)
the collection of which is stayed, at the time at which but for the making of the
jeopardy assessment, such amount would be due." Id. § 6863 (a). Treas. Reg. § 301.6863-
1(a) (2) (1957) permits the filing of bond at any time prior to actual collection by
levy or, "[i]n the discretion of the district director, after any such levy has been made
and before the expiration of the period of limitations on collection."
68. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 6213(a) grants the courts jurisdiction to enjoin the
assessment of a deficiency "during the time such prohibition [against assessments] is in
force . . . ." The prohibition applies "[elxcept as otherwise provided in section 6861
...." Although section 6861 does not explicitly invalidate a jeopardy assessment not
followed by the requisite notice, the mandatory nature of the provisions of section
6861(b), requiring notice to be issued within 60 days, implies that failure to issue
the notice invalidates the assessment. Bell v. Anglim, 29 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1456 (ND.
Cal. 1941), appeal dismissed, 127 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1942) (per curiam). Once the
section 6861 jeopardy assessment is invalidated, any further attempt to assess would be
subject to the prohibitions of section 6213(a). See Schreck v. United States, 301
F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md. 1969).
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under section 6851 is not a deficiency, statutory notice need not be
given, and a taxpayer suit under section 6213(a) to enjoin assessment
or collection of the short period liability should be dismissed. These
positions, each of which has received substantial support, revolve pri-
marily around conflicting interpretations of congressional intent. In
light of the recent increased use by the Service of section 6851, an ex-
amination of the arguments supporting these interpretations is war-
ranted.
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF PURSUANT TO SECTION 6213 (a)
The leading case supporting the proposition that a short period liability
is a deficiency is Schreck v. United States,6 9 in which the taxpayer re-
ceived a letter November 8, 1967, advising him that his 1967 taxable
year had been terminated and that an income tax of $20,730 for the
short period was immediately due and payable. The day following the
taxpayer's receipt of the letter, which stated that an assessment had
been made of the amount due and payable and that immediate payment
was demanded, the Service filed a notice of federal tax lien against him.
In addition, a notice of levy was served on an IRS district director who
was holding certain items of Schreck's personal property, including
$13,749.85 in cash, which had previously been seized by the IRS in con-
nection with alleged wagering tax violations. Because the Service did
not issue a statutory notice of deficiency, the use of the Tax Court for
prepayment review of the administrative action was foreclosed. 7
The taxpayer brought suit in the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland claiming that the short period liability was a
"deficiency" and that the IRS was required by section 6861 to issue a
notice of deficiency. The court examined the present Code section
defining "deficiency," as well as its predecessors. Section 273 of the
Revenue Act of 192671 defined a deficiency as the difference between
69. 301 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md. 1969), aff'd on rehearing, 7 P-H 1974 FED. TAxEs (33
Am. Fed. Tax R.2d) 74-462 (Dec. 19, 1973).
70. Although the IRS had levied upon substantially all the taxpayer's assets, the total
fell $7000 short of satisfying the short period liability. The taxpayer was therefore
precluded by the full payment rule of Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960),
from instituting a refund action. Moreover, the seizure of. substantially all his assets left
the taxpayer without sufficient funds to engage a bonding company. The difficulties
encountered by the section 6851 taxpayer in posting bond or bringing a refund suit
are discussed at notes 24-35 supra & accompanying text.
71. Act of Feb. 26, 1926, ch. 27, § 273, 44 Stat. 55, provided:
As used in this title in respect of a tax imposed by this tide the term
"deficiency" means-(1) The amount by which the tax imposed by this tide
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the tax liability and the amount shown on the return, or, if the amount
shown on the return is zero or if no return is filed, the administratively
determined tax liability. Although the current definitional section7 2
has deleted the second portion of the original definition and thus no
longer explicitly provides for a deficiency when no return has been
filed, the Sclreck court concluded that a short period liability never-
theless fits literally within the present statutory definition of deficien-
cy.7 The court acknowledged, however, that its interpretation of the
statute was not compelled and that its conclusions were based in part
upon the fundamental congressional purpose of permitting prepayment
litigation in the Tax Court.
The Service consistently has rejected the classification in Scbreck and
several other recent decisions74 of the short period liability as a de-
exceeds the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer upon his return;
but the amount so shown on the return shall first be increased by the
amounts previously assessed (or collected without assessment) as a de-
ficiency, and decreased by the amounts previously abated, credited, re-
funded, or otherwise repaid in respect of such tax; or (2) If no amount
is shown as the tax by the taxpayer upon his return, or if no re-
turn is made by the taxpayer, then the amount by which the tax exceeds
the amounts previously assessed (or collected without assessment) as a de-
ficiency; but such amounts previously assessed, or collected without assess-
ment, shall first be decreased by the amounts previously abated, credited,
refunded, or otherwise repaid in respect of such tax.
72. INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 6211. The text of section 6211 (a) is reproduced at
note 56 supra.
73. If it is assumed that no amounts have previously been assessed and no rebates
made, section 6211 (a) provides essentially that the term "deficiency" means the amount
by which the actual liability exceeds the liability admitted by the taxpayer on his
return, "if a return 'was made by the taxpayer and an amount was shown ... thereon
. . . "' I-r. RFv. CoDE oF 1954, § 6211 (a) (emphasis supplied). A literal reading of
the quoted language suggests that if no return was filed (as in a terminated year
situation), the subtrahend in the computation would be zero, and the "deficiency"
would be the actual tax liability. Employing this reasoning, the Schreck court con-
cluded that the deletion from section 6211 of language explaining the application of
the definition to situations in which there is no return did not justify an inference
of congressional intent to restrict the section's application. Used to support the court's
conclusion was the similarity of the Service's own regulations under section 6211 and
its predecessor. 301 F. Supp. at 1277. The regulations continue to provide that if no
return has been filed, "the deficiency is the amount of tax imposed." Treas. Reg.
5 301.6211-1 (a) (1954).
74. Rambo v. United States, 7 P-H 1974 FED. TAX=s (33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d) 74-463
(6th Cir. Feb. 12, 1974); Shaw v. McKeever, 7 P-H 1974 FED. TAxEs (33 Am. Fed. Tax
R.2d) 74-562 (D. Ariz. March 22, 1974); Williams v. United States, 7 P-H 1974 FsD.
TAxEs (33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d) § 74-361 (D. Nev. Nov. 16, 1973); Woods v. McKeever,
32 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5967 (D. Ariz. 1973); Lisner v. McCanless, 356 F. Supp. 398 (D.
Ariz. 1973), appeal pending; Clark v. Campbell, 341 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
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ficiency, maintaining that a deficiency, as defined in section 6211, is the
amount of unpaid tax for the full year. Classifying the short period
liability imposed under section 6851 as merely an interim determination
for protection of the revenue pending the filing of the taxpayer's full
year return,75 the Service argues that this tax, which it says "may be-
come due and may also become a deficiency," 76 cannot be finally de-
termined until the full year has ended; as such, the liability is not a de-
ficiency and need not be assessed under section 6861. Although it is
argued that other sections of the Code authorize the assessment of
section 6851 liabilities, substantial confusion has arisen as a result of
the inconsistent positions advanced by the IRS with respect to the source
of its assessment authority. 7 Originally, it was argued that section 6851
itself grants assessment authority independent of that provided in sec-
dons 6201 and 6861.78 Abandoning that position, the Service now main-
tains that section 6851 liabilities may be assessed under the general
authorization of section 6201.
Support for the government's position that a section 6851 liability is
not a deficiency is found in Irving v. Gray,79 which involved the termi-
nation of the taxable years of Clifford and Edith Irving, perpetrators of
the "Howard Hughes hoax." Irving, claiming to have written an author-
ized biography of the recluse billionaire, received $765,000 from a pub-
lishing company before the hoax was discovered. When the deception
was made public, the IRS, believing that Irving and his 'wife would
abscond with the money, terminated their taxable years, fixed a liability
of $512,111, and subsequently levied upon property being held for the
75. Parrish v. Daly, 350 F. Supp. 735 (S.D. Ind. 1972). See also G.C.M. 17195, XX,-2
GUM. BULL. 107, 110 (1936).
76. Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265, 1274 (D. Md. 1969).
77. Occasionally, the Service has even assessed under section 6861, thereafter issuing
a deficiency notice. Fancher v. United States, 10 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5925 (D.S.D.
1962). This is the very procedure it now attempts to avoid.
78. Rogan v. Mertens, 153 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1946); Schreck v. United States, 301
F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md. 1969); Puritan Church-The Church of America, 20 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 51,151 (1951); Ludwig Littauer & Co. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 840 (1938).
The Service wisely abandoned this position. The language of section 6851 suggests no
assessment authority, and an examination of the Code and prior revenue acts indicates
that congressional grants of assessment authority have consistently been explicit. See,
e.g., Ir. Rrv. CoDE op 1954, §§ 6659, 6671; Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 2351(c) (2), 2651 (c)
(2), 3612(f); Revenue Act of 1918, Act of Feb. 24, 1919, ch. 18, §§ 628, 702, 1003, 40 Stat.
1116, 1118, 1129. See also Rinieri v. Scanlon, 254 F. Supp. 469, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
("The government in its memorandum upon this motion concedes: 'Section 6851
confers no assessment authority .... ' ").
79. 479 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1973).
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Irvings by a brokerage firm. The Irvings brought suit to restrain the
Commissioner from further levying on their property or demanding
payment of the tax, arguing that a statutory notice of deficiency should
have been issued.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, rejecting the rationale
advanced in Schreck, denied the injunction, holding that a short period
liability is not a deficiency. In support of this conclusion, the court
relied upon the following statement of the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in Tilliamson v. United States: 80 " [Section 6211 ] de-
fines a deficiency as the amount by which the tax imposed exceeds the
amount shown on the tax return. The assessment in this case was not an
imposed tax, but merely an amount which the I.R.S. believed justified
the termination of the taxable year. Since no return had been filed at
the date of the assessment, no deficiency was determinable." "I
Difficulties with this analysis are readily observable. If a section 6851
liability is not an "imposed tax," then it is unlikely that it may be
assessed under section 620 1,82 which authorizes assessment of "all taxes
... imposed by this tide." Moreover, the court's declaration that a de-
ficiency cannot be calculated if no return has been filed is in direct con-
flict with regulations promulgated pursuant to section 6211 and stating
that if no return is made "the deficiency is the amount of the tax im-
posed ... ," 83
Notwithstanding the questionable reasoning which underpins the po-
sition of the Service as adopted in Irving, as well as the fact that a section
6851 liability satisfies the literal terms of the deficiency definition of
80. 31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'g on other grotnds 24 Am. Fed.
Tax R.2d 5561 (N.D. IM. 1969).
81. MI. Williamscmon has been quoted extensively in several recent cases. Its value
as precedent is questionable, however, since the court has withdrawn its opinion with-
out explanation.
The only authority cited in Willianson was Ludwig Littauer & Co. v. Commissioner,
37 B.T.A. 840 (1938). The court cited that decision for the proposition that "[slince
no return had been filed at the date of the assessment, no deficiency was determinable."
31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 800. The primary emphasis in Littauer, however, was upon
the temporary nature of the terminated period liability and the practical considerations
which make it inappropriate finally to determine the liability before the full year has
ended. It is submitted that the lVilliamson emphasis on the return as a measure of
the existence of a deficiency is questionable, since section 6851 liability does fit the
literal terms of the section 6211 definition of deficiency.
82. For further discussion of whether a short period liability may be assessed under
section 6201, see notes 140-61 infra & accompanying text.
83. See Trcas. Reg. § 301.6211-1(a) (1954).
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section 6211, there are a number of factors which militate against the
classification of a section 6851 liability as a deficiency. The language of
Code sections 6851 and 6861 and the regulations promulgated there-
under" suggests a fundamental distinction between the liabilities imposed
by those sections. Section 6851 and the corresponding regulations are
phrased in terms of a "tax" declared due and payable, while section 6861
refers specifically to "assessment or collection of a deficiency." More-
over, if a section 6851 liability were intended to be assessed under sec-
tion 6861, the directive in section 6851 that payment be demanded would
be superfluous, since that action is also authorized in section 6861.
Language in section 6658 imposing on taxpayers who "violate" sec-
tion 6851 a penalty in the amount of "25 percent of the total amount
of the tax or deficiency in the tax" 15 has nevertheless been utilized to
support the position that a section 6851 liability is a deficiency, to be
assessed under section 6861. The Scbreck court interpreted this pro-
vision as indicating "that a 'deficiency' may arise in a section 6851 sit-
uation." 86 It is submitted, however, that section 6658 is susceptible of
a second, more plausible, interpretation. Section 6851 requires the Serv-
ice to demand payment of the tax due for the preceding taxable year,
as well as for the terminated period. Thus, the term "deficiency" as used
in section 6658 may refer only to amounts still due for the full year
immediately preceding the terminated period. Arguably, Congress
would not have employed the disjunctive "tax or deficiency" in section
6658 if it had intended to equate short period and full year liabilities.8 7
The distinction between a terminated period liability and the de-
ficiency assessed under section 6861 is further indicated by the existence
of separate bond provisions for each section.88 Had Congress intended
short period liabilities to be assessed under section 6861, provision for
bond in section 6851 would be mere surplusage. Moreover, differences
in the bond provisions accentuate the distinction between liabilities
84. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.6851-1 (1959) with Treas. Reg. § 301.6861-1 (1961).
85. IiNT. REv. CoDx OF 1954, § 6658 provides: "If a taxpayer violates or attempts to
violate section 6851 (relating to termination of taxable year) there shall, in addition
to all other penalties, be added as part of the tax 25 percent of the total amount of the
tax or deficiency in the tax."
86. 301 F. Supp. 1265, 1275 n.12 (D. Md. 1969), aff'd on rehearing, 7 P-H 1974 FED.
TAXES (33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d) 74-462 (Dec. 19, 1973).
87. This interpretation was accepted in Irving v. Gray, 479 F.2d 20, 25 n.7 (2d Cir.
1973), the court stating: "The 'or' in this language supports our reasoning that there
has not been a deficiency asserted here.. .. "
88. Compare INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 6851 (e) with id. § 6863 (a).
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under sections 6851 and 6861. Section 6863, applying to assessments
under section 6861, provides that bond may be posted89 to stay collec-
don pending a final determination of the liability in the Tax Court."0
In contrast, section 6851 (e) permits bond "to insure the timely making
of returns with respect to, and payment of, such taxes" at the time
otherwise prescribed for payment,91 clearly indicating the temporary
nature of the section 6851 liability.
This temporary nature of the short period liability is also illustrated
by section 6851 (b) 92 and the accompanying regulations,9 3 which permit
reopening of the taxable period by either the Commissioner, upon a
finding of additional income during a subsequent period, or the tax-
payer, upon the filing of a return for the full year.94 It would seem
inappropriate to label the short period liability a deficiency, require is-
suance of a statutory notice, and permit the Tax Court to attempt a
"final" determination of the short period liability when either party
could reopen the taxable year and leave the Tax Court with no taxable
period to examine.9 5 Since the terminated period obviously cannot be
89. Id. § 6863 (a) provides in pertinent part: "When a jeopardy assessment has been
made under section 6861 or 6862, the collection of the whole or any amount of such
assessment may be stayed by filing with the Secretary or his delegate . . . a bond in
an amount equal to the amount as to which the stay is desired, conditioned upon the
payment of the amount (together with interest thereon) the collection of which is
stayed, at the time at which but for the making of the jeopardy assessment, such
amount would be due."
90. See id. 5 6863 (b).
91. Id. 5 6851(e) (emphasis supplied). The section provides, in full: "Payment of
taxes shall not be enforced by any proceedings under the provisions of this section prior
to the expiration of the time otherwise allowed for paying such taxes if the taxpayer
furnishes, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate, a bond to
insure the timely making of returns with respect to, and payment of, such taxes or any
income or excess profits taxes for prior years."
92. Id. 5 6851(b) provides, in pertinent part: "Notwithstanding the termination of
the taxable period of the taxpayer . . . the Secretary or his delegate may reopen such
taxable period each time the taxpayer is found . . . to have received income, within
the current taxable year, since a termination of the period under subsection (a). A
taxable period so terminated . .. may be reopened by the taxpayer ... if he files with
the Secretary or his delegate a true and accurate return of the items of gross income
and of the deductions and credits allowed under this title for such taxable period ....
93. Treas. Reg. § 1.6851-1(b) (1959).
94. The reopening of a terminated period had been approved by the Internal Revenue
Service prior to enactment of section 6851 (b). See G.C.M. 17195, XV-2 Cum. BuL.
107 (1936).
95. See Meyers, supra note 41, at 841.
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finally closed according to the terms of section 6851 itself,96 to permit
review in a forum which contemplates final adjudication would be
counterproductive.
This conclusion is reinforced by the regulations promulgated under
section 6851(a) permitting deduction of personal exemptions from a
short period liability. 7 Were a terminated period considered a regular
taxable year for purposes of adjudication, full allowance of the ex-
emption might create distortions if a year were terminated, used as the
basis for a final adjudication of liability, reopened to account for other
income, and again terminated. Classifying each terminated period as a
taxable year would permit the taxpayer more than one personal exemp-
tion in a single calendar year. Furthermore, the Service has provided
that a section 6851 terminated period is not to be considered a base
year or a computation year for purposes of income averaging.9 s This
96. The committee reports accompanying the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 clearly
indicate that subsection (b) of section 6851 was added specifically to avoid the pos-
sibility that a termination would result in more than one taxable year within a
12-month period:
Subsection (b) will apply, for example, in the case of an alien who
departs from and returns to the United States within the 12-month period
which would otherwise be his taxable year. Under existing law, such a
taxpayer 'would have more than 1 taxable year in the same 12-momh
period. This section provides that the taxable year shall be reopened if the
taxpayer files a true and accurate return of his items of gross income, de-
ductions, and credits, together with such other information as may be
required by regulations.
H.R. REu. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A421 (1954) (emphasis supplied). This con-
clusion is reinforced by Matthew Klaas, 36 T.C. 239 (1961), in which the Tax Court
held that a section 6851 terminated period was not a final taxable year for purposes of
section 6013 (a) (1), which permits joint returns by a husband and wife.
97. Treas. Reg. 5 1.6851-1(a) (1959) provides, in pertinent part: "[Tihe taxpayer
is entitled to a deduction for his personal exemptions (as limited in the case of certain
nonresident aliens) 'without any proration because of the short taxable period" (em-
phasis supplied). While not authorized by specific language in the current Code, this
regulation is clearly a reflection of the legislative intent in deleting a proration require-
ment from Int. Rev. Code of 1939, S 47(e), the predecessor of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
5 443 (c). The Senate report accompanying section 443 explained the change as fol-
lows: "The provisions of section 47(e) of the 1939 Code contained in subsection (c)
of the House bill have been deleted. There will be no proration of the personal ex-
emption in the case of a return for a short period by reason of. the termination of
the taxable year due to jeopardy." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 299 (1954).
98. Treas. Reg. § 1.1304-6(c), T.D. 7196, 1972-2 CuM. BuLL. 499, provides: "Termina-
tion of. taxable year for jeopardy. An individual who is required under section 443 (a) (3)
and the regulations thereunder to make a return for a period of less than 12 months
shall not take such short period into account as a computation year or a base period
year."
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restriction, reflecting that the temporary nature of a 6851 termination
makes the short period inappropriate for income averaging computa-
dons, lends additional support to the proposition that a terminated
period should not be treated as a final "taxable year." 99
These factors, taken together, manifest a congressional intent to
remove section 6851 liability from the statutory framework for pre-
payment review of "deficiencies" and to make that section available to
the Service as a means of preventing revenue loss prior to the time that
a full year liability can be finally adjudicated. Although there is now a
division on the point among the circuit courts of appeals, 100 the weight of
authority supports the proposition that a section 6851 taxpayer need not
be issued a deficiency notice under section 6861101 and thus that the
statutory exception to the anti-injunction statute is unavailable to the
taxpayer whose taxable year has been terminated.
In addition, even if a section 6851 taxpayer should obtain a decision
that a notice of deficiency is required in terminations under that section,
he may be faced with the necessity of establishing, as an element of his
suit under the section 6213 (a) exception to the anti-injunction statute,
99. If a terminated period were treated as a final "taxable year," it clearly would
fit the statutory definitions of computation year and base year, since both terms are
defined in INT. REv. CoDz oF 1954, S§ 1302(c) (1)-(2) with reference to a taxpayer's
"taxable year."
100. Compare Irving v. Gray, 479 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1973); Williamson v. United States,
31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'g on other grounds 24 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d
5561 (N.D. Ill. 1969), 'with Rambo v. United States, 7 P-H 1974 FED. TAxEs (33 Am.
Fed. Tax R.2d) 74-463 (6th Cir. Feb. 12, 1974).
101. Conpare Irving v. Gray, 479 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1973); Williamson v. United States,
31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1971); Schmidt v. United States, 7 P-H 1974 FED.
TAxEs (33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d) 74-486 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 1974); Millington v. Conley,
7 P-H 1974 Fm. TA.Xs (33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d) 74-322 (D. Conn. June 21, 1973);
Laing v. United States, 32 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5789 (D. Vt. 1973); Wilits v. Richardson,
32 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5474 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Hogan v. United States, 32 Am. Fed. Tax
R2d 5507 (ED. Mich. 1973); Parrish v. Daly, 350 F. Supp. 735 (S.D. Ind. 1972); Lud-
wig Littauer & Co. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 840 (1938), with Hall v. United States,
7 P-H 1974 Fm. TAxvs (33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d) 74-518 (6th Cir. March 12, 1974);
Rambo v. United States, 7 P-H 1974 FED. TAXES (33 Am. Fed. Tax R2d) 74-463 (6th
Cir. Feb. 12, 1974); Shaw v. McKeever, 7 P-H 1974 FED. TAxEs (33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d)
1 74-562 (D. Ariz. March 22, 1974); Williams v. United States, 7 P-H 1974 FED. TAXES
(33 Am. Fed. Tax R2d) 74-361 (D. Nev. Nov. 16, 1973); Woods v. McKeever, 32 Am.
Fed. Tax R.2d 5967 (D. Ariz. 1973); Lisner v. McCanless, 356 F. Supp. 398 (D. Ariz.
1973), appeal pending; Clark v. Campbell, 341 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Tex. 1972); Schreck
v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md. 1969), aff'd on rehearing, 7 P-H 1974 FED.
TA XES (33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d) 74-462 (Dec. 19, 1973).
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the existence of traditional grounds for equitable relief.1 2 In Hogan v.
United States,' for example, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan rejected the plaintiff's contention that
failure to issue a notice of deficiency warrants automatic injunctive re-
lief, stating: "By its terms, [section 6213 (a)] simply removes from
operation the effect of the anti-injunctive provision of Section 7421,
thereby allowing the court, in its discretion, to grant or deny injunctive
relief under the traditional and familiar rules of equity. Among these
is the requirement that irreparable harm be alleged by the party seek-
ing injunctive relief and shown to be threatened if no injunction is
granted." 104
The Hogan view, however, is not universally accepted. In Lisner v.
McCanless,1°5 the United States District Court for the District of Ari-
zona issued an injunction under the section 6213 (a) exception notwith-
standing an explicit finding0 6 that the plaintiffs had failed adequately to
establish irreparable harm. Other courts, in cases involving section 6861
jeopardy assessments of full year deficiencies, have held a showing of
irreparable harm unnecessary on the ground that the section 6213 (a)
prohibition on assessment without notice of deficiency should not de-
pend upon the circumstances of the taxpayer.0 7 In jurisdictions which
do require a showing of irreparable harm, it might appear that a tax-
payer, all of whose assets have been seized, should have little difficulty
in satisfying this requirement. On the other hand, at least one court
has held that a taxpayer's loss of his home, business, and all other worldly
possessions is merely a hardship.108
Although a few courts have issued injunctions pursuant to section
6213 (a), the foregoing analysis, together with rejection by the weight
of authority of classification of the short period liability as a "deficien-
cy," indicate that the statutory exception to the anti-injunction pro-
visions of section 7421 should be unavailable to the section 6851 tax-
payer. The possibility of having to establish irreparable harm in those
jurisdictions which hold that an injunction under section 6213 (a) is
102. See Hogan v. United States, 32 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5507 (E.D. Mich. 1973);
Irving v. Gray, 344 F. Supp. 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
103. 32 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5507 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
104. Id. at 5511.
105. 356 F. Supp. 398 (D. Ariz. 1973), appeal pending.
106. Id. at 400-01.
107. Ventura Consol. Oil Fields v. Rogan, 86 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1936); Gunn v.
Mathis, 157 F. Supp. 169, 178 n.4 (WD. Ark. 1958).
108. Morton v. White, 174 F. Supp. 446 (E.D. II. 1959).
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available in a section 6851 situation only compounds the dismal prospects
for relief. Nevertheless, the short period taxpayer who pursues equitable
relief under the judicial exception to the anti-injunction statute faces
even greater obstacles.
JUDICIAL EXCEPTION TO THE ANTI-INJUNCTION STATUTE' 09
Until recently, the extent of the judicial exception to the provisions
of section 7421 was not clearly defined, courts relying instead upon the
general statement that the anti-injunction statute could be avoided only
in "exceptional circumstances." "I Illustrative is Miller v. Standard Nut
Margarine Co.,"' which involved an attempt by the IRS to impose an
oleomargarine tax on a product which, according to the Service's own
interpretation, was not subject to the tax. The Supreme Court, declaring
that the anti-injunction statute could not be circumvented by a mere
assertion that assessment or collection of a tax was improper, held that
the bar to equitable relief was removed in "exceptional circumstances."
Finding that the tax sought to be imposed was "illegal," the Court en-
joined the collection activities of the IRS.
The distinction between an illegal tax and one merely excessive or
improperly assessed was clarified in 1962 when the Supreme Court
articulated what is generally considered the controlling test of section
7421 applicability. In Enocbs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co.," 2
109. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, S 7421. The text of this section is reproduced at note
36 supra. The general effect of the anti-injunction statute is discussed in Lenoir, Con-
gressional Control over Suits to Restrain the Assessment or Collection of Federal
Taxes, 3 Amz. L. REv. 177 (1961); Lipton & Petri, Enjoining Assessment or Collection
of a Tax, N.Y.U. 18u INST. ON FFD. TAx. 957 (1960); Note, Enjoining the Assessment
and Collection of Federal Taxes Despite Statutory Prohibition, 49 HARV. L. REv. 109
(1935); Comment, Avoiding the Anti-Injunction Statute in Suits to Enjoin Termination
of Tax-Exempt Status, 14 XVm. & MARY L. REv. 1014 (1973). The application of the
anti-injunction statute to section 6861 jeopardy assessments is discussed in Gould,
jeopardy Assessments: When They May Be Levied and What to Do About Them,
N.Y.U. 18nT INst. ON FED. TAX. 937 (1960); Hochman & Tack, Jeopardy Assessments-
A System in jeopardy, 45 Tamxs 418 (1967); Kaminsky, Administrative Law and
Judicial Review of Jeopardy Assessments under the Internal Revenue Code, 14 TAx
L. RI;v. 545 (1959); Note, Jeopardy Assessment: The Sovereign's Stranglehold, 55
GEo. L.J. 701 (1967).
110. See Bailey v. George, 259 U.S. 16 (1922); Dodge v. Osborn, 240 U.S. 118, 122
(1916) ("[I]t is obvious that the statute plainly forbids the enjoining of a tax unless
by some extraordinary and entirely exceptional circumstances its provisions are not
applicable.").
11I. 284 U.S. 498 (1932).
112. 370 U.S. 1 (1962).
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it was held that an injunction could be granted notwithstanding section
7421 if a taxpayer demonstrates that under no circumstances could the
government prevail 13 and that irreparable harm would result from the
denial of equitable relief." 4 The two-part Enochs test, while adding a
degree of certainty to the scope of section 7421, appears to impose a
heavier burden on the taxpayer than was previously the case.
When an injunction is sought to restrain assessment or collection of
a terminated period liability, the taxpayer may argue that determination
of his liability was faulty or that there was no basis for the jeopardy find-
ing. To prevail on either ground, the taxpayer must meet the double-
pronged Enochs test. For purposes of the discussion which follows, it
will be assumed that the taxpayer can establish irreparable harm,"' since
it is in demonstrating that the government will be unable to prevail that
the section 6851 taxpayer generally will encounter an insuperable ob-
stacle.
Contesting the Liability Determination
That a taxpayer can establish the inability of the government to pre-
vail on the issue of income tax liability is questionable in light of cases
such as Jones v. Vinal,"6 in which it was held that this showing re-
quires a demonstration that the taxpayer had absolutely no income
113. The Supreme Court held that a suit must be dismissed unless it is "apparent
that, under the most liberal view of the law and the facts, the United States cannot
establish its claim . . ." Id. at 7. It has since been indicated in Thrower v. Miller,
440 F.2d 1186 (9th Cir. 1971), that as long as there is evidence on each side of a factual
issue, there is no basis for holding that the government cannot prevail. The taxpayer
in Thrower alleged that his signature on a waiver of the statute of limitations con-
trolling assessment had been obtained by fraud. Reversing the district court, the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a conflict in the affidavits of the taxpayer
and the revenue agent was sufficient to render the judicial exception inapplicable. But
see Sherman v. Nash, 488 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1973) (proof that government's purpose
in making jeopardy assessment was to harass held sufficient to avoid anti-injunction
statute).
114. The courts apply varying standards in determining what constitutes irreparable
harm. The Supreme Court in Enocbs indicated that ruination of the taxpayer's business
would suffice. 370 U.S. at 6. Accord, Midwest Haulers, Inc. v. Brady, 128 F.2d 496
(6th Cir. 1942). But see Morton v. White, 174 F. Supp. 446 (ED. Ill. 1959) (loss of
taxpayer's home, business, and all worldly possessions merely a hardship). The Court
in Enocks also made clear that adequacy of alternative legal remedies remains an
important consideration in determining whether harm is irreparable. 370 U.S. at 6.
115. See note 114 supra.
116. 31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1339 (D. Neb. 1973).
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during the period in question.17 Since this is an impossible feat for most
taxpayers,"" an attack on the method of computation, rather than the
liability itself, may be more profitable. Although no cases have yet
arisen under section 6851 involving methods of computation, this issue
has been frequently litigated under section 6861. An analysis of these
decisions should provide a fair indication of probable judicial response
to challenges under section 6851.
In Pizzarello v. United States,19 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit enjoined a jeopardy assessment based on a calculation projecting
a three-day average of gross wagering receipts over a five-year period.
The court held the calculation totally arbitrary 20 since there was no
factual basis for assuming that the three days' income was typical or that
the operation had been conducted over a period of five years.' 2' Other
117. The precise holding in Jones was that a taxpayer challenging an income tax
assessment for a section 6851 terminated period must prove that the government cannot
prevail with respect to any part of the assessment.
118. It is particularly difficult for a taxpayer to prove that the government cannot
prevail on the liability issue in a jeopardy case. Initially, it should be noted that in
most instances in which taxpayers have succeeded in attacking assessments, the attacks
were made on grounds distinguishable from those available to a jeopardy taxpayer
contesting the liability determination. Many successful attacks, for example, have in-
volved excise taxes. See, e.g., Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498 (1932).
It is one thing to prove that an oleomargarine tax does not apply to a product, as was
the case in Standard Nut, but quite another to prove that an income tax is excessive and
thus that the government cannot prevail.
In other successful cases the individual contesting the assessment was not the taxpayer
but a transferee against whom the government had no colorable claim. See, e.g.,
Raffaele v. Granger, 196 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952). See also Shelton v. Gill, 202 F.2d 503
(4th Cir. 1953); Trinacia Real Estate Co. v. Clarke, 34 F.2d 325 (N.D.N.Y. 1929);
Rosenthal v. Allen, 75 F. Supp. 879 (M.D. Ga. 1948). Although these cases all involved
jeopardy assessments, the defense clearly would have been unavailable to the taxpayer
against whom the assessment was made.
Finally, taxpayers have successfully enjoined collection of assessed liabilities while
the statutory prohibition on the sale of assets was in force. See, e.g., Smith v. Flinn,
261 F.2d 781 (1958), modified per curivn, 264 F.2d 523 (8th Cir. 1959), in which the
taxpayer attacked not the assessment but the Commissioner's authority to sell the
assets during the stay provided in INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 6863(b) (3).
119. 408 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 986 (1969). Accord, Lucia v.
United States, 474 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1973).
120. The court also held the assessment invalid on the alternative ground that the
only information which the government had to support its computations was ob-
tained illegally. 408 F.2d at 586. This argument is, of course, available to any taxpayer
who can prove the element of illegality.
121. See also Rinieri v. Scanlon, 254 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (a refund action
in which an assessment was invalidated for lack of "one shred of proof" to support it).
While Pinieri involved a refund, it is clear that under appropriate circumstances a
court may overturn an assessment as well.
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courts, however, have upheld the following computation methods at
least as questionable as those in Pizzarello: a projection of one day's
betting slips over 62 weeks; 2 two days' slips projected over a period of
two and one-half years;12' a "sheet count" to project motel income;124
and "towel counts" to project the incomes of a barber'25 and a bor-
dello. 26 It would appear that most courts will accept a computation
method if the IRS has the slightest evidence to support its factual as-
sumptions, on the ground that the government cannot be held to any
requirement of accuracy if a taxpayer's records of illegal activities are
incomplete.
Although the familiar attacks on the government's liability determi-
nations thus have little likelihood of success, Attorney Eugene L. Meyers,
in an exhaustive treatment of section 6851,127 has suggested an interpre-
tation of that section which, if valid, could be utilized by the terminated
period taxpayer to establish as a matter of law that the government can-
not prevail on the issue of liability. The basic argument is twofold: first,
there is no basis under section 6851 for imposing a tax liability for the
terminated period; and, second, even assuming that liability may be
imposed, the Service has no authority to assess it. Obviously, either as-
sertion, if valid, would make injunctive relief mandatory.
The conclusion that no liability may be imposed for the short period
is reached after an analysis of various interrelated sections of the Code.'2-
Although section 443 (a) provides that a return shall be filed for section
6851 short periods,129 Mr. Meyers asserts that since the Service has
failed to promulgate regulations implementing that provision there cur-
rently is no requirement that a return be filed. 3' He then argues that
122. Pinder v. United States, 330 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1964).
123. Fiorella v. Commissioner, 361 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1966).
124. Agnellino v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 797 (3d Cir. 1962).
125. Joel Newton, 39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 70,103 (1970).
126. 57 Herkimer St. Corp., 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 61,223 (1961), aff'd per curiam,
316 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1963).
127. Meyers, Termination of Taxable Year: Procedures in Jeopardy, 26 TAx L. Rv.
829 (1971).
128. Id. at 834-37.
129. Ter. REv. ConE oF 1954, § 443 (a) provides, in pertinent part: "A return for a
period of less than 12 months (referred to in this section as 'short period') shall be
made under any of the following circumstances: . . . (3) When the Secretary or his
delegate terminates the taxpayer's taxable year under section 6851 ... "'
130. Treas. Reg. § 1.443-1(a) (3) (1957) provides: "A return must be filed for
a short period resulting from the termination by the Commissioner of a taxpayer's tax-
able year for jeopardy. See section 6851 and the regulations thereunder" (emphasis sup-
plied). Neither section 6851 nor the regulations thereunder mentions a return for the
short period except in the case of departing aliens. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6851-1 (1959).
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because the computation of taxable income under section 441 is based
upon the existence of a "taxable year," 131 defined as either the fiscal or
calendar year, or the period for 'which the return is made,"12 the short
period (neither a fiscal nor a calendar year) must be computed, if at
all, on the basis of a return. Since there is no requirement that a return
be filed for the short period, it is concluded that the liability cannot be
computed. 33
Mr. Meyers does acknowledge that "[s]ection 6851 is couched in
such strong directory language that it might well be argued that the
section itself is sufficient to impose a tax liability for the terminated
period." 14 It is not necessary, however, to rely solely on the manda-
tory nature of section 6851 for the imposition of short period liability.
It is submitted that a close reading of the legislative history of section
441 indicates that a return need not be filed to impose liability in section
6851 cases.
Although a taxpayer's normal taxable year is a calendar year under
section 441 (b) (3), the invocation of section 6851 by the Commissioner
merely modifies that definition of taxable year for interim collection
purposes, as the section title "Termination of Taxable Year" implies.
Thus, the truncated period is, in essence, a shortened "calendar" year
for purposes of computation. This interpretation is supported by an
examination of the predecessor to section 441 at the time the predeces-
sor to section 6851 was first enacted. Section 212(b) of the Revenue
Act of 1918"'1 provided that taxable income would be computed on the
basis of the taxable year,"36 defined in section 200 as either a calendar
or fiscal year;"17 the definition did not extend to periods of less than
131. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 441(a) provides: "Taxable income shall be computed
on the basis of the taxpayer's taxable year."
132. Id. § 441(b) provides: "For purposes of this subtitle, the term 'taxable year'
means-(l) the taxpayer's annual accounting period, if it is a calendar year or a fiscal
year; (2) the calendar year, if subsection (g) applies; or (3) the period for which the
return is made, if a return is made for a period of less than 12 months."
133. Meyers, supra note 127, at 837. The ability to compute taxable income is, of
course, essential, since taxes are imposed only upon "taxable income." INT. REv. CODE
or 1954, 5 1.
1034. Meyers, supra note 127, at 837.
135. Act of Feb. 24, 1919, ch. 18, § 212(b), 40 Stat. 1064.
136. The statute provided: "The net income shall be computed upon the basis of
the taxpayer's annual accounting period (fiscal year or calendar year, as the case may
be) ... ." Id.
137. Id. § 200, 40 Stat. 1058, provided: "That when used in this title-The term 'tax-
able year' means the calendar year, or the fiscal year ending during such calendar
year, upon the basis of which the net income is computed under section 212 or section
232."
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12 months for which a return was made. Yet, at the same time, Congress
enacted section 250(g)138 permitting termination of a taxable year and
further providing that the tax for the terminated period was immediately
due and payable. Clearly, if its action in adding section 250(g) had
any meaning, Congress believed that it was possible to compute the
short period liability.'39 That it was possible to compute the tax for a
short period in 1918 when "taxable year" was defined only as a calendar
or fiscal year is thus manifest; that it is still possible is a reasonable in-
ference, since section 6851 retains language virtually identical to that
of its predecessor.
A second, and unrelated, argument presented by Mr. Meyers sug-
gests that the Service has no authority to assess a short period liability,
assuming the existence of that liability.14° In the absence of a valid assess-
ment, the government would be powerless to collect the tax adminis-
tratively. Thus, the section 6851 taxpayer could challenge a levy of
his assets notwithstanding the anti-injunction statute, since it could be
established as a matter of law that the government had exceeded its
statutory authority.
Mr. Meyers agrees with the weight of authority that a short period
liability is not a deficiency and thus cannot be assessed under section
6861.141 Assessment, consequently, can be made only under the gen-
eral authorization in section 6201, which, that section provides, "shall
extend to and include" taxes shown on a return, unpaid taxes payable
by stamp, erroneous income tax prepayment credits, and erroneous
credit under section 39.142 The phrase "shall extend to and include"
is interpreted by Mr. Meyers as limiting assessment authority to the
enumerated situations, only the first of which has possible applicability
to a section 6851 liability. Under section 6201 (a) (1), assessment is
permitted only when a return is actually filed; 4 1 the section 6851 tax-
payer, however, is not required to file a return for the short period. 41
Mr. Meyers observes, moreover, that the IRS is permitted to prepare
a "dummy" return under section 6020 only when a taxpayer "fails"
138. Id. § 250(g), 40 Stat. 1084.
139. The predecessor of INr. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 443 (a) (3), requiring the filing of
returns for section 6851 short periods, was not enacted until 1928. Act of May 29, 1928,
ch. 852, § 47(f), 45 Star. 791, 807.
140. Meyers, supra note 127, at 838-39.
141. Id. at 839-43. See cases cited in note 101 supra.
142. INT. R~v. CODE OF 1954, § 6201 (a). See note 53 supra.
143. Id. § 6201 (a) (1). See Treas. Reg. § 301.6201-1 (a) (1) (1954).
144. See notes 129-30 supra & accompanying text.
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to make a return "required" by law. 145 Because the Service has pre-
scribed neither the time nor the procedure for filing, he argues that the
Service has no authority under section 6020 to prepare a "dummy"
return.1" 6 Under this reasoning, since a section 6851 liability cannot be
shown on a return, the conclusion appears inescapable that the general
assessment under section 6201 does not "extend to" a short period
liability.
In response to this conclusion, it is submitted that the phrase "shall
extend to and include" in no way limits the general assessment authority
under section 6201. An examination of the legislative history of the
section indicates that a restrictive reading of that section is unwarranted.
Section 6201 (a) is a codification of several separate assessment authori-
zations originally scattered throughout the 1939 Code and previous rev-
enue acts. Prior to 1872 the revenue statutes did not phrase the authoriza-
tion in terms of assessment, although the procedure was clearly similar to
that employed today. For example, in 1864, the relevant provision re-
quired the tax assessors "from time to time as duties, taxes, or licenses
become liable to be assessed [to] make out lists containing the sums
payable .... ,, 147
In 1872148 the offices of assessor and assistant assessor were eliminated
and their duties transferred to collectors of internal revenue.149 The as-
sessment authorization provided that "the commissioner of internal rev-
enue is hereby authorized and required thereafter to make the inquiries,
145. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6020(b) provides, in pertinent part: "(1) . . . If
any person fails to make any return . . . required by any internal revenue law or
regulation made thereunder at the time prescribed therefore, or makes, willfully or
otherwise, a false or fraudulent return, the Secretary or his delegate shall make such
return from his own knowledge and from such information as he can obtain through
testimony or otherwise. (2) . . . Any return so made and subscribed by the Secretary
or his delegate shall be prima facie good and sufficient for all legal purposes."
146. Mr. Meyers contends that notwithstanding the clear requirement in INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 443 (a) that a return be filed for the terminated period, the Service's
failure to carry through the mandate to the regulations promulgated under section
6851 and to prescribe the time and procedure for filing such returns under INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 6071, indicates that "the taxpayer cannot be said to have been required
and then failed to have made such return." Meyers, supra note 127, at 837. He con-
cludes, therefore, that the IRS has no authority to prepare a "dummy return" in these
circumstances.
147. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 20, 13 Stat. 229 (emphasis supplied).
148. There had been only one intervening amendment, and it did not materially
alter the 1864 provision. Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 9, 14 Stat. 103.
149. Act of Dec. 24, 1872, ch. 13, § 1, 17 Stat. 401.
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determinations, and assessments of the following taxes, to wit: . . ." "I
There followed several specific references to certain taxes and the catch-
all "all other internal-revenue taxes liable to be assessed." 151 That pro-
vision remained unchanged until federal legislation was first codified
in the Revised Statutes. 5 2 The codification amended the assessment
authorization, stating: "The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is hereby
authorized and required to make the inquiries, determinations, and
assessments of all taxes and penalties imposed by this Title, or accruing
under any former internal revenue act, where such taxes have not been
duly paid by stamp at the time and in the manner provided by
law . " 153
The assessment authorization in the Revised Statutes contained no
limitations, 54 and the provision was reenacted in substantially the same
form through 1918 (when the first predecessor of section 6851 was
enacted) and until 1954. In the interim, it was recodified in almost
identical language as section 3640 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939.11 In addition to section 3640, the 1939 Code included assessment
provisions relating to specific taxes 5  and certain sections qualifying the
general authorization, 57 as had prior revenue acts. 58
. The general authorization contained in section 3640 of the 1939 Code
was reenacted as section 6201 (a) of the 1954 Code, together with all
other assessment provisions under the 1939 Code. 15 9 The phrase "shall
150. Id. § 2, 17 Stat. 402.
151. Id.
152. 18 Star. (Pt. 1) (1873-74).
153. Rev. Stat., Title XXXV, ch. 2, § 3182, 18 Stat. 614 (1873-74) (emphasis supplied).
154. The limitations placed on assessment authority in 1924 and 1926 related only to
situations involving statutory deficiencies. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 234, §§ 274, 900(e),
43 Stat. 297, 337; Act of Feb. 26, 1926, ch. 27, §§ 274, 904, 44 Stat. 55, 106.
155. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3640, 53 Stat. 442, provided: "The Commissioner is
authorized and required to make the inquiries, determinations, and assessments of all taxes
and penalties imposed by this title, or accruing under any former internal revenue law,
where such taxes have not been duly paid by stamp at the time and in the manner
provided by law" (emphasis supplied).
156. See, e.g., id. §§ 2351(c) (2), 2651(c) (2), 3311, 3612(f), 53 Stat. 256, 284, 400, 438.
157. See, e.g., id. § 59(d), 58 Stat. 244.
158. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 24, 1919, ch. 18, §§ 628, 702, 1003, 40 Stat. 1116, 1118, 1129.
159. Thus, INT. REv. COD OF 1954, § 6201 includes various assessment provisions
from the Int. Rev. Code of 1939, including section 3640 (the general authorization),
section 3647 (the delegation authorization), section 3612(f) (authority to assess amounts
shown on a return executed by the Commissioner), section 2351(c) (2) (filled cheese
stamp tax), section 2651(c) (2) (white phosphorus stamp tax), section 3311 (general
authorization for unpaid stamp taxes), and section 59(d) (limitation on assessment
authority with respect to estimated income taxes).
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extend to and include" was added to the general authorization in 1954,
but there is no indication that Congress intended the phrase to limit the
authority to the specified situations. To the contrary, the House report
accompanying the 1954 Code explicitly stated: "This section makes
two material changes from existing law. The first permits the assessment
of the amount of any check or money order, given in payment for
stamps, which is not duly paid. . . . There is also a material change
from existing law in subsection (a) (3) of this section, relating to er-
roneous credits for prepayment of income ... ,, 160 The only acknowl-
edged material changes increased, rather than limited, the general au-
thority to assess. Section 6851 liability clearly could be assessed under
section 3640 of the 1939 Code; eliminating authority to assess such
liability would have constituted a third material change. Various
courts have explicitly agreed that a short period liability is properly
assessable under section 6201.161
160. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong, 2d Sess. (1954). Notably, neither of the actions
newly authorized could have been taken under the general authority to assess taxes.
161. See Irving v. Gray, 479 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1973); Williamson v. United States, 31
Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1971); Schmidt v. United States, 7 P-H 1974 FED. TAXES
(33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d) 74-486 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 1974); Millington v. Conley, 7 P-H
1974 FED. TAxEs (33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d) 74-322 (D. Conn. June 21, 1973); Laing v.
United States, 32 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5789 (D. Vt. 1973); Willits v. Richardson, 32 Am.
Fed. Tax R.2d 5474 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Hogan v. United States, 32 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d
5507 (E.D. Mich. 1973); Parrish v. Daly, 350 F. Supp. 735 (S.D. Ind. 1972); Ludwig
Littauer & Co. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 840 (1938). But see Hall v. United States,
7 P-H 1974 FED. TAxES (33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d) 74-518 (6th Cir. March 12, 1974);
Rambo v. United States, 7 P-H 1974 FED. Ta.xEs (33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d) 74-463 (6th
Cir. Feb. 12, 1974); Shaw v. McKeever, 7 P-H 1974 FED. TaxEs (33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d)
74-562 (D. Ariz. March 22, 1974); Williams v. United States, 7 P-H 1974 FED. TAXES
(33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d) 74-361 (D. Nev. Nov. 16, 1973); Woods v. McKeever, 32 Am.
Fed. Tax R.2d 5967 (D. Ariz. 1973); Lisner v. McCanless, 356 F. Supp. 398 (D. Ariz.
1973), appeal pending; Clark v. Campbell, 341 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Tex. 1972); Schreck
v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md. 1969), aff'd on rehearing, 7 P-H 1974
Fr. TAxES (33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d) 74-462 (Dec. 19, 1973). In each of the latter
cases it was held that a short period liability is a deficiency and therefore assessable under
section 6861. With the exception of Lisner v. McCanless, supra, however, none of these
cases intimated that section 6201 would otherwise be inapplicable.
It is arguable, nevertheless, that the Service to some extent has limited its own authority,
even if section 6201 in fact authorizes assessment of the terminated period liability.
By regulation the Service has provided that if a taxpayer files a return the amount
of the section 6201 assessment shall be the amount shovn on the taxpayer's return.
Treas. Reg. § 301.6203-1 (1954). If the taxpayer were given an opportunity to file a short
period return under section 443 (a) (3), the Service, without arguing against its own regu-
lations, could not assess an amount beyond that which the taxpayer admits. On the other
hand, since the taxpayer normally is given no opportunity to file a return, the Service
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In summary, the section 6851 taxpayer seeking equitable relief under
the judicial exception to the anti-injunction statute has little chance of
satisfying the Enochs requirement that he establish that the government
cannot prevail, at least when the challenge is to the existence of an
underlying tax liability for the short period. A successful attack
upon the liability determination itself seemingly requires a showing
that the taxpayer had absolutely no income during the short period.
Challenges to the Service's method of computation, while successful
in a few instances, more often have been defeated if the IRS has had
any factual basis for its calculations. Finally, two novel arguments-
that termination of a taxable year imposes no liability, or, assuming a
liability, that the Service has no authority to assess-are based upon
questionable interpretations of the various Code sections. One final
line of attack remains available to the section 6851 taxpayer, however.
Challenging the Jeopardy Findings
The remaining ground for seeking an injunction notwithstanding sec-
tion 7421 is the lack of a basis in fact for the Commissioner's findings of
jeopardy under section 6851. Under section 6861 assessment is au-
thorized if the Commissioner "believes" assessment or collection will be
jeopardized by delay. It has been stated that section 6861 vests assess-
ment authority in the Commissioner's sole discretion,'1 2 that a jeopardy
assessment, by its very nature and purpose, is arbitrary,1 3 and that
there are no statutory standards against which to test a finding of
jeopardy.164 On these grounds, the courts consistently have refused to
examine the foundation for the Commissioner's belief. 5
should not be permitted to execute one for him under section 6020(b). See Meyers,
supra note 127, at 837. In any event, the absence of a return should not preclude the Serv-
ice from assessing under authority of section 6201 (a).
162. E.g., Lloyd v. Patterson, 242 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1957).
163. Homan Mfg. Co. v. Long, 242 F.2d 645, 649-50 (7th Cir. 1957). That the section
6861 jeopardy assessment was intended to be arbitrary in nature is indicated by the
language used in the Senate report accompanying a 1953 amendment to section 6861 to
permit the abatement of unjustified assessments. S. REP. No. 730, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1953), states, in part: "Under existing law if the Bureau of Internal Revenue believes
that ultimate collection of a tax is in danger, it may make a so-called jeopardy assess-
ment. This is an arbitrary assessment designed to get control of available assets of the
taxpayer pending final determination of the liability, if any." Id. at 2398-99 (emphasis
supplied).
164. Veeder v. Commissioner, 36 F.2d 342 (7th Cir. 1929).
165. The courts have refused to question the propriety of jeopardy findings in
Milliken v. Gill, 211 F.2d 869 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 US. 827 (1954); Veeder v.
Commissioner, 36 F.2d 342 (7th Cir. 1929); Clark v. Campbell, 341 F. Supp. 171 (ND.
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A comparison of sections 6861 and 6851 reveals that the same ra-
tionale may not apply to jeopardy findings under the latter section. 66
Section 6851 authorizes termination of the taxpayer's taxable year only
where the Commissioner "finds that a taxpayer designs quickly to de-
part from the United States or to remove his property therefrom, or to
conceal himself or his property therein, or to do any other act tending
to prejudice or to render wholly or partly ineffectual proceedings to
collect the income tax . , 16" Thus, while a jeopardy assessment
under section 6861 may not be susceptible of review for lack of stand-
ards, such standards apparently are available under section 6851 to de-
termine whether the Commissioner had any factual basis for a "finding"
of jeopardy.
Since the Commissioner is required to make specific findings with
respect to the taxpayer's intentions and since, moreover, only a certain
type of taxpayer "design" will justify immediate collection, judicial
Tex. 1972) (injunction issued, however, on the ground that the statutory exception
to section 7421 was applicable); Kimmel v. Tomlinson, 151 F. Supp. 901 (SD. Fla.
1957); Communist Party, U.S.A. v. Moysey, 141 F. Supp. 332, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1956);
Publishers New Press, Inc. v. Moysey, 141 F. Supp. 340 (SD.N.Y. 1956); Salikoff v.
McCaughn, 24 F.2d 434 (E.D. Pa. 1928). But see Kaminsky, Administrative Law and
Judicial Review of Jeopardy Assessments Under the Internal Revenue Code, 14 TAX
L. Rm,. 545 (1959), a well-reasoned article advocating the application of ordinary
standards of judicial review to the section 6861 "belief" that jeopardy exists. The argu-
ment is premised on the proposition that under section 6213(a) the entire area of
deficiencies is removed from the operation of the anti-injunction statute and that,
while the Commissioner may advance the time of assessment in cases involving jeopardy.
the mere assertion of that circumstance does not automatically preclude injunctive
relief. Id. at 554-57. It is argued, moreover, that the phrasing of section 6861 in terms
of the Commissioner's belief does not remove the necessity that there be a basis in
fact for such a belief. See H.R. RE. No. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1925), 1939-1 Cum.
BULL. 322: "By 'jeopardy' is meant cases where the Commissioner finds the assessment
or collection of the tax will be jeopardized by the delay incident to the proceedings
before the Board and the courts" (emphasis supplied). The article concludes that sec-
tion 6861 does not authorize discretionary action insulated from judicial review. Not-
withstanding the persuasive force of these arguments, they have yet to receive acceptance
by the courts.
166. See Gould, Jeopardy Assessments. When They May Be Levied and What to
Do about Them, N.Y.U. 18TH INsv. ON FED. TAX. 937, 941 (1960).
167. INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 6851 (a) (emphasis supplied). The language of the
House report which accompanied the first predecessor of section 6851 illuminates con-
gressional intent. The Committee on Finance stated in 1918: "Authority is given to
the Commissioner to take summary proceedings for the collection of the tax in cases
'where there is evidence that the taxpayer designs to evade the tax by a sudden departure
from the United States or by removal or concealment of his property." H.R. REP. No.
617, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1918), G.C.M. 17195, XV-2 Cum. BULL. 107, 109 (1936)
(emphasis supplied).
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review is seemingly available. The last sentence of section 6851(a)
further supports this inference: "In any proceeding in court brought
to enforce payment of taxes made due and payable by virtue of the pro-
visions of this section, the finding of the Secretary or his delegate...
shall be for all purposes presumptive evidence of jeopardy." 16, The
statement absent from section 6861, that the Commissioner's finding is
"presumptive evidence," implies that the finding is rebuttable. That the
statement applies specifically to collection suits does not necessarily
suggest that the findings are nonreviewable in other proceedings. On
the contrary, if it is accepted that the Commissioner's discretion is not
absolute, the taxpayer should be able to challenge its exercise in a suit
for injunction as well.
Three recent cases suggest judicial willingness to scrutinize the Com-
missioner's findings of jeopardy. In Rinieri v. Scanlon'69 a Swiss citizen
was carrying approximately $247,500 aboard an airplane bound for
Switzerland. Shortly after the cash was seized by narcotics agents and
turned over to the IRS, the taxpayer's year was terminated under sec-
tion 6851 and a demand made for payment of $247,820 in tax. At the
trial, the agent who had computed the liability reluctantly admitted
that his estimate of taxable income had no factual basis and was asserted
merely to make the tax approximate the amount seized. On the basis of
this testimony, the court, finding absolutely no evidence that the money
was even earned in the United States, held that the termination of the
taxable year was arbitrary, capricious, and unconscionable. Rejecting
the government's reliance upon the presumption of jeopardy to support
its assessment, the court emphasized: "If there are no taxes due there
can be no 'jeopardy.'" 170 Although Rinieri involved a refund suit, the
decision clearly demonstrates that the presumption of jeopardy may be
rebutted.!71
United States v. Bonaguro172 involved a taxpayer arrested for posses-
sion of counterfeit notes, following which his taxable year was termi-
nated and an assessment made for approximately $2,000. The govern-
ment could produce no evidence that it had followed the statutory pro-
cedures or even that it had investigated the taxpayer's affairs. It was
held that, although findings of jeopardy cannot be examined, the Com-
168. INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, § 6851 (a) (emphasis supplied).
169. 254 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
170. Id. at 474.
171. Contra, Fancher v. United States, 10 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5925 (D.S.D. 1962).
172. 294 F. Supp. 750 (ED.N.Y. 1968).
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missioner had failed to demonstrate that he had made any findings. The
court concluded: "[T]he inference is-in short-that [the Service]
had not acted under the statute to protect the revenue interest and col-
lect a tax that seemed to be in jeopardy, but had made a merely colorable
use of the statutory forms at the suggestion of another agency of gov-
ernment in accordance with a pattern of conduct that is not strange to
the courts." 1 The Bonaguro court thus indicated that while a jeopardy
finding may be nonreviewable the government must at least prove that
such a finding was in fact made and that applicable statutory procedures
were followed in other respects.
Finally, in Lisner v. McCanless'7 4 the United States District Court for
the District of Arizona, holding that it was precluded from examining
jeopardy findings because of the taxpayer's failure to demonstrate ir-
reparable harm, nevertheless stated that the Commissioner's finding of
jeopardy is only presumptive, not conclusive. 7h The court thus indi-
cated a willingness to examine the Commissioner's findings in a
proper case. Whether other courts will demonstrate a similar attitude
is doubtful, given the strong aversion to reviewing the grounds for the
Commissioner's "belief" under section 6861. It is submitted, even so,
that in light of the indications of reviewability found within section
6851, as well as in the legislative history of that section, a challenge
to the Service's jeopardy findings is potentially the strongest available
to a taxpayer who, being able to satisfy the requirement of irreparable
harm, pursues injunctive relief notwithstanding the anti-injunction
statute.
PROTECTION OF THE REVENUE OR THE INDIVIDUAL
The confusion concerning the procedure to be used under section
6851 is likely a result of congressional failure to adapt that section to
a changing framework of tax collection procedures. At the time provi-
sion initially was made for revenue collection, the right of the govern-
ment to collect the full amount of a tax prior to litigation of the tax-
payer's liability was assumed. Consequently, the additional grant of
173. Id. at 753-54.
174. 356 F. Supp. 398 (D. Ariz. 1973). The taxpayer prevailed in this case, the court
holding that a short period liability is a deficiency and must be assessed under section
6861. Since the requisite notice was not issued, the assessment was enjoined under the
statutory exception to the anti-injunction statute. See note 37 supra & accompanying
text.
175. 356 F. Supp. at 401 n.4.
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authority to the Commissioner to accelerate the due date for payment
was consistent with the contemporaneous procedural scheme. The
creation of the Board of Tax Appeals, however, signaled congressional
awareness of the tremendous impact of an arbitrary or mistaken assess-
ment and an attempt to accord the taxpayer some protection.176 Never-
theless, as the authority of the Board, later the Tax Court, was expanded,
no concomitant changes were made in section 6851.'7
The paucity of legislative history concerning section 6851 permits a
number of reasonable but conflicting inferences with respect to the
reason section 6851 was left virtually unchanged while Congress con-
tinually revised the statutory framework for resolution of tax disputes
in other situations. It could have intended, as -the Service argues, to
maintain section 6851 as a separate procedure, for use by the Service
in proper circumstances, without restriction. On the other hand, as the
court in Sebreck concluded, the failure to make section 6851 explicitly
subject to the deficiency procedures may indicate only that Congress
found it unnecessary to so provide, the section 6851 liability fitting
literally within the Code's definition of deficiency.
Section 6851 was enacted to maximize protection of the revenues by
ensuring collection efficiency.178 Permitting the Service to invoke sec-
tion 6851 without restriction clearly is an effective method of achieving
this concededly desirable goal. It is equally clear, however, that such
an approach frustrates the attainment of another, equally desirable
goal-protection of the taxpayer's right to his property. Under the
Service's approach a taxpayer against whom section 6851 is invoked
may be left without recourse to the courts until the Service completes
a full-year audit, which may entail up to three years.
Classifying the terminated period liability as a deficiency and using
the section 6861 jeopardy assessment procedure is initially appealing.
Such an approach requires the issuance of a statutory notice of de-
ficiency within 60 days after assessment and thus provides the taxpayer
ready access to the Tax Court. Additionally, the propriety of this classi-
fication is suggested by the proximity in the Code of sections 6851 and
176. H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong, 1st Sess. 7 (1924).
177. Until recently, the section was used sparingly and, in those cases, directed
primarily against departing aliens. See, e.g., Rogan v. Mertens, 153 F.2d 937 (9th Cir.
1946). The fact that the section was infrequently invoked likely accounts for con-
gressional failure to adapt it to modem collection procedures.
178. See, e.g., Ludwig Littauer & Co. v. Commissioner, 37 B.TA. 840, 841 (1938).
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6861.1'9 Nevertheless, the temporary nature of a section 6851 liability
determination, as indicated by the language of the section 8' and its
separate bond provision,' 81 clearly demonstrates that the Tax Court
would be an inappropriate forum for its review. 82 More important is
the fact that the terminated period may be reopened by either the
Service or the taxpayer,'813 with the anomalous result that jurisdiction
of the Tax Court, once acquired, may be lost whenever the taxable
period is reopened. If the Tax Court were to adjudicate a taxpayer's
liability, that decision subsequently could be invalidated by events which
either augment or offset portions of the income allegedly due for the
period.184 Although subjecting the section 6851 liability to the deficiency
procedures protects the taxpayer, such an approach does not conform
with a proper reading of the Code and suggests sufficient practical dif-
ficulties to render it unworkable.
It is thus apparent that neither of these interpretations achieves the
desired balance between private and governmental interests. What is
needed is a method to provide the taxpayer early access to the courts
without seriously impairing the ability of the Service to protect the reve-
nue under section 6851. It is submitted that the simplest and most direct
means of striking such a balance is to adopt the Service's interpretation
of its authority to assess and collect a section 6851 liability'85 while per-
179. Both sections are classified under the general heading "Jeopardy." See Lisner
v. McCanless, 356 F. Supp. 398 (D. Ariz. 1973), wherein the court asked: "If, as the
government concedes, section 6851 authorizes no assessment in a jeopardy case, then
what different type of jeopardy is controlled by the next section, '6861 Jeopardy
Assessment'?" Id. at 402.
180. See note 84 supra & accompanying text.
181. See notes 88-91 supra & accompanying text.
182. See notes 92-101 supra & accompanying text.
183. INr. R. CoDE oF 1954, § 6851 (b).
184. Meyers, supra note 127, at 842.
185. This position is already accepted by a majority of courts. Compare Irving v.
Gray, 479 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1973); Williamson v. United States, 31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d
800 (7th Cir. 1971); Schmidt v. United States, 7 P-H 1974 FED. TAXES (33 Am. Fed.
Tax R.2d) 74-486 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 1974); Millington v. Conley, 7 P-H 1974 FED.
TAXES (33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d) 1 74-322 (D. Conn. June 21, 1973); Laing v. United
States, 32 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5789 (D. Vt. 1973); Willits v. Richardson, 32 Am. Fed.
Tax R.2d 5474 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Hogan v. United States, 32 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5507
(E.D. Mich. 1973); Parrish v. Daly, 350 F. Supp. 735 (S.D. Ind. 1972); Ludwig Littauer
& Co. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 840 (1938), witb Hall v. United States, 7 P-H 1974
FED. Tkxms (33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d) 74-518 (6th Cir. March 12, 1974); Rambo v. United
States, 7 P-H 1974 FED. TAXES (33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d) 9 74-463 (6th Cir. Feb. 12, 1974);
Shaw v. McKeever, 7 P-H 1974 FED. TAXES (33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d) t 74-562 (D. Ariz.
March 22, 1974); Williams v. United States, 7 P-H 1974 FED. TAXES (33 Am. Fed. Tax
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mitting the taxpayer to test the specific application of that authority to
a limited extent during the year in question, as well as through the
deficiency procedures shortly after the close of the full year.
Once the district director makes the requisite findings under section
6851 and terminates the taxable period, the Service should be permitted
to assess under section 6201. As previously discussed, the legislative
history indicates that section 6201 authorizes such an assessment. 86
This formal determination of the taxpayer's liability gives rise to a
lien and authorizes the use of levy and distraint. Since the purpose of
section 6851 is to provide for interim collection only, and not to impose
a final liability, the administrative remedies should be limited to preser-
vation of the status quo. Thus, administrative sale of the taxpayer's
assets should be prohibited by a new Code provision similar to present
section 6863 (b) (3),187 regardless of whether the taxpayer has posted
bond under section 6851(e).
If a taxpayer's assets are seized or subjected to a lien on the basis of
a section 6851 liability assessment, the courts should entertain a taxpayer
suit to enjoin the assessment. Although this could be done under exist-
ing law, judicial reluctance to hear such suits suggests the propriety of
amending section 7421 to authorize them specifically. To prevent arbi-
trary use of section 6851 by the Service, the district courts should ex-
amine the factual basis for jeopardy findings, especially since section
6851 specifically delineates those activities which require termination
of the taxable year.8 8 Moreover, the district courts should determine
whether the Service followed the statutory procedure and whether the
method employed to compute the liability was valid.8 9
The courts should not, however, be permitted to determine substan-
tive liability issues. As stated in Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine
Co.,' 9 the rationale for the anti-injunction statute is to prevent a vacuum
of authority where collection is enjoined but no court has jurisdiction
R.2d) 74-361 (D. Nev. Nov. 16, 1973); Woods v. McKeever, 32 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d
5967 (D. Ariz. 1973); Lisner v. McCanless, 356 F. Supp. 398 (D. Ariz. 1973), appeal
pending; Clark v. Campbell, 341 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Tex. 1972); Schreck v. United States,
301 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md. 1969), aff'd on rehearing, 7 P-H 1974 FED. TAxES (33 Am.
Fed. Tax R.2d) 74-462 (Dec. 19, 1973).
186. See notes 147-61 supra & accompanying text.
187. The relevant provisions of INTr. Rxv. CODE oF 1954, § 6863(b) (3) are explained
in note 65 supra.
188. See notes 166-69 supra & accompanying text.
189. See notes 169-75 supra & accompanying text.
190. 284 US. 498, 509 (1932). See also Kaminsky, supra note 109, at 548-49.
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to adjudicate finally the liability issues prior to collection. When a tax-
payer's taxable year has been terminated, no court can decisively ad-
judicate the liability at that time because the taxable period is not finally
closed. Hence, the rationale of the anti-injunction statute is applicable
and judicial review of the underlying liability would be inappropriate
except to the extent the taxpayer can establish that the Service's de-
termination has no factual basis.' 9' In an injunction suit brought after
termination but prior to the end of the full year, judicial review thus
should be limited to an examination of issues with respect to the existence
of jeopardy and the methods of computing liability. In accordance
with the legislative purpose of section 6851, any reasonable doubts
should be resolved in favor of the government. 92
If the taxpayer injunction suit succeeds, the Service would naturally
be limited to its normal procedures for collection of the taxpayer's full
year liability. If, on the other hand, the government prevails, or if no
injunctive action is brought, some means is necessary to compel the
Service to complete its full year audit and collect the full year liability
expeditiously. 93 This could be accomplished by amending the Code to
provide that if the Service collects a terminated period liability through
administrative assessment and levy, it must issue a notice of deficiency
within 60 days after the taxpayer files a full year return.
Finally, the Service itself could prevent the arbitrary use of section
6851 by adopting and enforcing internal controls to ensure that termi-
nation of a taxable year is necessary to protect the revenue and not, as
the court in Bonaguro stated, to make "a merely colorable use of the
statutory forms at the suggestion of another agency of government in
191. Thus, the rule in Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co, 370 U.S. I
(1962), would remain applicable to the liability issue.
192. The application of a "reasonable doubt" standard would substantially lessen
the burden of proof presently imposed upon taxpayers in injunction suits by Enochs
v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962), while retaining the tradi-
tional emphasis of section 6851 upon protection of the revenue.
193. This could be accomplished by means of a taxpayer injunctive action. If the
Service delayed beyond a reasonable time in pursuing its full year procedures, the
courts could consider such delay prima facie evidence that the Service did not, in fact,
consider collection of the tax in "jeopardy." Otherwise, it could be argued, the
Service would have assessed immediately the liability for the remaining portion of
the year in question under the full year jeopardy assessment provision in section 6861.
Under such circumstances the courts could require the Service to abate the terminated
period assessment, return any seized assets to the taxpayer, and pursue any further
claims in accordance with the normal deficiency procedures. Since the courts are
unlikely to adopt such an approach, however, an amendment to the Code seems war-
ranted.
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accordance with a pattern of conduct that is not strange to the
courts." 194 By exercising care to ensure that its extraordinary authority
is used only for valid revenue purposes, the Service not only would
avoid many problems in the first instance but should also increase judi-
cial willingness to sustain that authority when conflicts do arise.
194. 294 F. Supp. 750, 753-54 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). See also Pizzarello v. United States
408 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 986 (1969); Rinieri v. Scanlon, 254
F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
